Vol. XXX. ISSUE 4 (Fall 2023) French - African Neo- Colonial Relations, and African Coups

Published:

Table of Contents

Gloria Emeagwali : Editorial

Toyin Falola :  Sorrow, Tears and Blood: France and its Permanent Colonies

 

Eze Eluchie:    Africa’s Coup Season 

Assie-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo: Cote d’Ivoire in the French and Global Capitalist System

Conference Announcement

Editorial

The Bongo dynasty of Gabon, Central Africa,  has been in power for half a century. Does the coup of August 30, 2023,  signal  the end of the dynasty, or just the perpetuation of power by a faction within it? Given  the family ties between the new leader, and Omar and Ali Bongo, the two rulers since political Independence, should we expect more of the same, or a clean break with the past, under Brice Oligui Nguema, the new head of state? What relationship would there be with about one hundred French companies in Gabon? Will the proceeds from petroleum, manganese, uranium, and forestry be equitably shared, within the country, or simply monopolized by local and foreign operatives? These are some of the questions that immediately came to mind after the  Gabonese coup announcement.

But it seems that this coup had the blessing of the former colonial power, France. There is no talk of military intervention and sanctions, by the latter,  and NATO. This could mean business as usual, for France and the EU, in the context of  dirt-cheap compensation for Gabonese resources, and external control of the economy, in neo-colonial terms - a tradition set in place since Independence.

 In the words of Gardenier, D. In  “France and Gabon Since 1993: The Reshaping of a Neo-Colonial Relationship.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies,  18,2, 2000:

“Gabon, since its independence in August 1960, had maintained a clientist relationship with its French patron within a neo-colonialist framework. The arrangements were institutionalized in the 15 cooperation agreements under which Gabon received aid and assistance, including personnel, to operate its state institutions (including education), to develop its economy and protect its security. These agreements perpetuated French economic control and increased French desires to have a Gabonese government that was friendly to their interests. After the death of Gabon's first president, Léon Mba, in November 1967, agents from President Charles de Gaulle's office selected the young Omar Bongo as his successor, in part because of Bongo's willingness to maintain France's privileges..”

The coup of August 30, 2023, apparently continues  that earlier tradition.

On another note, it is ironical that two of the most undemocratic leaders in the continent,  have been among the most passionate advocates for military intervention against Guinea, Burkina Faso,  and more recently,  Niger, namely,  Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast, and  Macky Sall of Senegal. Ouattara came to power on the heels of French military intervention, and the removal from office of  the third term  presidential seeker, Laurent Gbagbo, who admittedly, undermined his pan-Africanist  credentials by doing the opposite of what he preached. With the active help of Guillaume Soro, Secretary General of the New Forces, Ouattara in 2002,  climbed on to the seat of power in Abidjan. Not long after, he created some trumped up charges against Soro, driving into exile, the man who fought at notable risk, on his behalf. Ouattara had the audacity to seek  a third term, and  probably has plans for a fourth term in office! He  has locked up, with impunity, countless political prisoners , without due process- with not even a whimper of disapproval from  France, the European Union, or the sanctimonious  West, as a whole.

The other vocal cheer leader for intervention, Senegal’s Macky Sall,  only abandoned his plan to elongate his term in office, after weeks of vocal public protests against his scheme. But Mr. Sall decided to borrow a few leaves from Ouattara’s  playbook in dealing with  his most ardent and formidable opponent,  Ousmane Sonko. Unceremoniously, he threw Mr. Sonko in jail,  to bar him from the 2024 election, an election that Sonko could  probably win with minimal effort. He also banned Sonko’s  party, Patriotes africains du Senegal pout le travail, l’ethique et la fraternite, PASTEF. Sonko is a fervent opponent and activist against French hegemony in Senegal, not surprisingly. Macky Sall is an ardent defender of French interests.

During early pro-independence negotiations, the colonizers were ready to give up political power, but  not economic control. Toxic “cooperation agreements” were made  in areas such as raw materials, foreign trade, monetary policy,  education, and the military. Countries  were compelled to  remain within the CFA franc zone. Leaders like Sylvanus Olympio of Togo and  Modibo Keita of Mali “ were thwarted in their ambitions”(Pigeaud and Sylla 2018, 63–79).

On-going  activities of the coup leaders of  Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger include:

  • Reassessment of the true value of  local resources such as bauxite, gold, uranium etc. From compensation of 5 percent in mining projects, Guinea and Mali demand around  30 percent for gold and bauxite. Introduction of new mining codes: “The mining code reform could boost the national budget by 500 billion CFA francs ($820 million), “ said Alousseni Sanou in the case of Mali.

  • Evaluation of the extent of  exploitative plunder of France and others. Niger is reassessing its real role in global uranium production,  and Mali reassesses its gold.

  • Recognition of the true sacrifices of the founding fathers. Guinea has re-embraced Sekou Toure and renamed its airport after him. Thomas Sankara is honored by Burkina Faso not only in name, but in the  adoption of selected policies.

  • Revival of Indigenous textiles (Burkina Faso), Indigenous hair styles (Guinea) etc. 

  • Valorization of Indigenous languages. Mossi  will no longer play second fiddle to French (Burkina). The Mandinka  language regains its place as a cherished medium of  communication (Mali). A local traditional hand -woven cloth called “Faso Danfani” has been made the official cloth for school uniforms and official state dress, boosting the local cotton industry and the economy.

  • Deployment of local strategies for managing conflict, outwitting the self proclaimed masters of the world, through patience, interception of telephone calls, interruption of supply lines, and mass mobilization.

  • Diversification of  allies beyond France and Europe,  to include friendly East Asian countries and others.

  • Regional  cooperation and  trans- border solidarity. Creation of a defense pact involving Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. 

  • Renegotiation of French monetary and financial predatory impositions, with  plans for the replacement of the neo-colonial CFA.

  • Enhancement of counter trade.

 

In this issue of Africa Update, Toyin Falola, the Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the  Humanities at the University of Texas at Austin, author and editor of close to  two hundred books, explores some of the ramifications of French colonial policy, and  France’s  nefarious activities in the Sahel. Attorney Eze Eluchie, an activist legal expert in the field of human rights and development, follows, with  an illuminating article on the underlying causes  of the various coups that have unfolded recently. Exactly twenty years ago, Prof. Lumumba-Kasongo and Prof. Assie-Lumumba of Cornell University, contributed  to Africa Update, a two-part article on French African relations,  with reference to Cote d’Ivoire. We include excerpts of this illuminating piece, in this issue, given its continued relevance for understanding the mechanisms of French neo-colonial policy and the reactions that it has generated.

We thank  the contributors to this issue of Africa Update for their insights on French neo- colonialism and the  various forms of resistance against it.

Professor Gloria Emeagwali

Chief Editor

Africa Update

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Sorrow, Tears and Blood: France and its Permanent Colonies

Toyin Falola

 

It is indeed overdue for France to cut its losses — whatever it envisages they are — and step back from its permanent colonies to allow the people of Francophone Africa to decide on their preferred paths to the future. After nearly 200 years of take, the people have good reasons to say France should leave. The restlessness and the coups that have become commonplace in the region are symptoms of deeper underlying social, economic, and political problems…

France ruined Haiti, the first Black country to become independent in 1804. France is on the course to ruining all its former African colonies. It is no coincidence that the recent spate of coups in Africa has manifested in former French African colonies (so-called Francophone Africa), once again redirecting the global spotlight on France’s activities in the region. And that the commentaries, especially amongst Africans, have been most critical of France and its continued interference in the region.

This is coming in the backdrop of France’s continuous meddling in the economic and political affairs of “independent” Francophone countries, an involvement which has seen it embroiled, both directly and indirectly, in a series of unrests, corruption controversies, and assassinations that have bedeviled the region since independence. Unlike Britain and other European countries with colonial possessions in Africa, France never left — at least not in the sense of the traditional distance observed since independence by the other erstwhile colonial overlords. Instead, it has, under the cover of a policy of coopération (cooperation) within the framework of an extended “French Community,” continued to maintain a perceptible cultural, economic, political, and military presence in Africa. 

On the surface, the promise of coopération between France and its former colonies in Africa — which presupposes a relationship of mutual benefit between politically independent nations — where the former would, through the provision of technical and military assistance, lead the development/advancement of its erstwhile colonial “family,” is both commendable and perhaps even worthy of emulation. However, when this carefully scripted façade is juxtaposed with the reality that has unfolded over the decades, what is revealed is an extensive conspiracy involving individuals at the highest levels of the French government. Along with other influential business interests — also domiciled in France — they have worked with a select coterie of African elites to orchestrate the most considerable and heinous crimes against the people of today’s Francophone Africa. A people who, even today, continue to strain under the weight of France’s insatiable greed.

    

The greed and covetousness that drove European nations to abandon trade for colonization in Africa, is alive today as it was in the 1950s and 1980s. The decision to give in to African demands for independence was not the outcome of any benevolence or civilized reason on the part of Europe but for economic and political expedience. Thus, when the then President of France, Charles de Gaulle — who nurtured an ambition to see France maintain its status as a world power — agreed to independence for his country’s African colonies, it was only a pre-emptive measure to check the further loss of French influence in the continent. In other words, the political liberation offered “on a platter of gold,” as a means to avoid the development of other costly wars of independence which, as World War II depleted, France was already fighting in Indochina and Algeria.

In pursuit of its interests in Africa, France has made little secret of its contempt for all independent and populist reasons, while upholding puppet regimes. In Guinea in 1958, De Gaulle embarked on a ruthless agenda to undermine the government of Ahmed Sékou Touré — destroying infrastructure and flooding the economy with fake currency in the process — for voting to stay out of the French Community.

Independence was, thus, only the first step in ensuring the survival of French interests in Africa and, more importantly, its prioritization. Pursuant to this objective, De Gaulle also proposed a “French Community” —delivered on the same “golden platter” — as a caveat to continued French patronage. As such, the over ninety-eight per cent of its colonies which agreed to be part of this community, were roped into signing coopération accords — covering economic, political, military, and cultural sectors — by Jacques Foccart, a former intelligence member of the French Resistance in the Second World War, handpicked by De Gaulle. This signing of coopération accords between France and the colonies, which opted to be part of its post-independence “French Community” marked the beginning of France’s neo-colonial regime in Africa, where Africans got teachers and despotic leaders in exchange for their natural resources and French military installations.

   

Commonly referred to as Françafrique — a pejorative derivation from Felix Houphouet Boigny’s “France-Afrique,” describing the close ties between France and Africa, France’s neo-colonial footprint in Africa has been characterized by allegations of corruption and other covert activities perpetrated through various Franco-African economic, political, and military networks. An essential feature of Françafrique is the crookish, mafia-like relations between French leaders and their African counterparts, which has been reinforced by a dense web of personal networks. On the French side, African ties, which had been the domaine réservé (sole responsibility) of French presidents since 1958, was run by an “African cell” founded and managed by Jacques Foccart. Comprising French presidents, powerful influential members of the French business community and the French secret service, this cell operated outside the purview of the French parliament, its civil society organization, and non-governmental organizations. This created a window for corruption, as politicians and state officials took part in business arrangements, which amounted to state racketeering.  

Whereas pro-French sentiments in Africa, and without, still argue for France’s continuous presence and contributions, particularly in the areas of military intervention and economic aid, which they say have been critical to security, political stability and economic survival in the region, such arguments intentionally play down the historical consequences of French interests in the region. Enjoying a free reign in the region —backed mainly by the United States and Britain since the Cold War, France used the opportunity to strengthen its hold on its former colonies. This translated into the development of a franc zone — a restrictive monetary policy tying the economies of Francophone countries to France, as well as the adoption of an active interventionist approach, which has produced over 120 military interventions across fourteen dependent states between 1960 and the 1990s. These interventions, which were either to rescue stranded French citizens, put down rebellions, prevent coups, restore order, or uphold French-favored regimes, have rarely been about improving the fortunes of the general population of Francophone Africa. French interventions have maintained undemocratic regimes in Cameroon, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, and Niger. At the same time, its joint military action in Libya was responsible for unleashing the Islamic terrorism that is threatening to engulf countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria.

In pursuit of its interests in Africa, France has made little secret of its contempt for all independent and populist reasons, while upholding puppet regimes. In Guinea in 1958, De Gaulle embarked on a ruthless agenda to undermine the government of Ahmed Sékou Touré — destroying infrastructure and flooding the economy with fake currency in the process — for voting to stay out of the French Community. This behavior was again replicated in Togo, where that country’s first president, Sylvio Olympio, was overthrown and gruesomely murdered for daring to establish a central bank for the country outside the Franc CFA Zone. Subsequently, his killer, Gnassingbé Eyadema, assumed office and ruled from 1967 till his death in 2005 — after which he was succeeded by his son, who still rules.

…as we call on France to do the honorable thing and withdraw, we should also rebuke Africa’s leaders who have not only put their interests above those of their people but have also turned the instruments of regional intervention and development (like the AU and ECOWAS) into tools for ensuring their own political survival. 

In Gabon, you had the Bongo family, who ran a regime of corruption and oppression, with the open support of France, throughout 56 years of unproductive rule. As for Cameroun’s most promising, pan-Africanist, pro-independence leader, Felix Moumie, he died under mysterious circumstances in Switzerland, paving the way for the likes of Paul Biya, who has been president since 1982. France also backs a Senegalese government, which today holds over 1,500 political prisoners, and had singlehandedly installed Alhassan Ouattara as president of Cote d’Ivoire.

Therefore, the widespread anti-France sentiment spreading through the populations of Francophone Africa and beyond is not unfounded, as it has become apparent to all and sundry that these countries have not fared well under the shadow of France. In Niger, where France carried out one of the bloodiest campaigns of colonial pacification in Africa — murdering and pillaging entire villages — and which is France’s most important source of uranium, the income per capita was 59 per cent lower in 2022 than it was in 1965.

In Cote d’Ivoire, the largest producer of cocoa in the world, the income per capita was 25 per cent lower in 2022 than in 1975. Outside the rampant unemployment, systematic disenfranchisement and infrastructural deficits that characterize these Francophone countries, there’s also the frustration and anger of sitting back to watch helplessly. In contrast, the wealth of your country is being carted away to nations whose people feed fat on your birth right and then turn around to make judgements and other disparaging comments on your humanity and conditions of existence. The people are tired of being poor, helpless, and judged as third-world citizens! France is a dangerous country.

It is indeed overdue for France to cut its losses — whatever it envisages they are — and step back from its permanent colonies to allow the people of Francophone Africa to decide on their preferred paths to the future. After nearly 200 years of take, the people have good reasons to say France should leave. The restlessness and the coups that have become commonplace in the region are symptoms of deeper underlying social, economic, and political problems, including weak institutions, systematic disenfranchisement, poverty, corruption and/or misappropriation of national wealth. And as we call on France to do the honorable thing and withdraw, we should also rebuke Africa’s leaders who have not only put their interests above those of their people but have also turned the instruments of regional intervention and development (like the AU and ECOWAS) into tools for ensuring their own political survival. 

This paper was first  published in Premium Times Nigeria, September 11, 2023

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Coup Season

Eze Eluchie

African Center for Health Law and Development

When soldiers of the Republic of Niger’s Presidential Guards in the morning of 26th July 2023,  detained President Mohamed Bazoum in a bloodless coup d’etat, the spontaneity of jubilations across Niger was quite infectious. Outsiders distant from the pains and sufferings of the people of Niger would be astounded, but any familiar with this mineral rich country whose population have been derided for decades as ‘one of the poorest countries on earth,’ will understand the euphoria. Here was a country which was a major producer of uranium and had rich gold reserves, yet the population barely felt the wealth of their country, whilst conglomerates from France and other European entities profited immensely from Niger. Niger was on an edge and the slightest tilt was bound to effect the change witnessed in the coup. Coming barely two weeks after the pronouncement by newly installed Chairperson of the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Nigeria’s Placeholder President, Bola Tinubu, that ECOWAS would not tolerate any ‘unconstitutional’ changes in political leadership across the sub-region. The July Coup in Niger set up an early test-case for the potency of ECOWAS.

 

In a hurriedly convened meeting of some Heads of Governments of ECOWAS member States in Abuja, chaired by Mr. Tinubu. ECOWAS, in view of Nigeria’s enormous financial contributions towards the sustenance of the West African regional multi-State organization, had made Tinubu  Chairman, during his very first attendance at any ECOWAS meeting. ECOWAS rather undiplomatically and contrary to the regional bodies practices to arrive at decisions via consensus and unanimous agreements, brashly ordered those who had deposed the government in the Republic of Niger to vacate office within a week or face military intervention from ECOWAS.  Noticeably absent at the said ECOWAS Heads of State meeting, were the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Equatorial Guinea. That the Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS would arrive at such a controversial decision without ensuring all the member states of the organization were on board was bound to later haunt the sub-regional body.

 

Being himself, a character who has been accused by some of having snatched and ran with political power in the 25th of February 2023 Presidential elections in Nigeria, Mr. Tinubu, was clearly in no position whatsoever to challenge the soldiers who grabbed power in similar vein. It is however important to note that unlike Tinubu, General Abdourahamane Tchiani and his compatriots apparently have the support of the overwhelming majority of Nigeriens and peoples of the West Africa sub-region.

 

It must be pointed out at this stage that in the absence of unanimity amongst ECOWAS countries, any invasion of Niger (as being planned by some countries with support and prodding by some Western countries) would be an illegitimate war. Already, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea have indicated that any attack on Niger Republic would be taken by those three geographically and linguistically contiguous countries, as an attack against their peoples. 

 

Those who fail to condemn persons who attain political power by scuttling the Constitutions of their respective countries via acts of electoral heist and stealing votes, should spare us sanctimonious indignations when non-politicians (in the strict sense of that phrase) opt to intervene in the political space. Such condemnations of non-politicians’ interventions in politics by non-politicians get more condescending if the intervention has the approval and support of the domestic population. The old saying of universal validity that ‘those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent change inevitable’ comes to light once more. When the existing political process consistently churns out scions and cronies of those who have held the population backwards, it is only a matter of time before the bubble bursts. The argument that any ‘democratic arrangement’ is better than military regimes is, as has been experienced by the peoples of West Africa, a fallacy from the pit of hell.

Are coups okay only when supported and planned by some external powers,  and bad when it has popular support? Is the condemnation and sanctioning being applied by some Western countries merely for the purposes of exploring and ensuring protection of external interests, and will such be relaxed,  once age old parochial interests, which have left the peoples of the affected country pauperized, are assured?

 

The West (the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union et al), should not taint their existing moral authority as democracies by prodding the mastermind and prime beneficiary of Nigeria’s 2023 electoral heist to plunge the West Africa region into needless and wasteful fratricidal conflict. The implications of the continuing push by some Western countries, notably France, Britain and the United States for ECOWAS military intervention in Niger is that arguments being made by NATO against Russia for its ‘special military operations’ in Ukraine would be exposed as hypocritical and nonsensical, if any countries supporting Ukraine were to participate in an illegitimate invasion on and against the peoples of Niger Republic.

Additionally, demands that former Nigerien President, Bazoum, be ‘released unconditionally’ being touted by the US, British and French governments is clear unsolicited interference in the internal affairs of Niger. A call for expedient production of the deposed President before requisite judicial authorities in Niger for the prosecution of any charges the new Government in Niamey may have against the deposed ruler, would have been more realistic and responsible.

Despite being awash with vast deposits of mineral and natural resources, countries across Africa, particularly in the Sahel, West and Central regions of the continent, have maintained near-permanent positions on the low rankings in global index for negatives. Whilst the vast majority of the populations in the various countries in these region eke out a living at low levels, the individuals opportune to rule over the mineral-rich countries in these regions are globally notorious for ostentatious lifestyles, junketing in state-of-the-art private jets and yacht, shopping at the most exquisite and exclusive of designer outlets, purchasing multi-million dollar mansions and making payment for all these purchases and lifestyles in cash, and generally portraying themselves as living life to the fullest. 

 

 

Continuing hemorrhage by former colonial overlords

Visible foreign collaborators with the ruling echelon of these African countries, are the same colonial overlords from whom the African countries had gained ‘flag’ independence in the 1960’s – mainly France and Britain. These two European countries continue to maintain, with support of an elite looting class to whom they had ‘relinquished’ political power, lecherous relationships which serve to impoverish the vast majority of the populations in the African countries, allowing vain perks to the looting class whilst the colonial overlords, through deft bilateral agreements retain stifling control over the assets of the African countries. The French are more brazen in their approach as they virtually control the economy, serve as Central Bank, and maintain military bases in all their former colonies. The British on the other hand are suave about their overbearing control, as they impose stooges and operate more from behind the scenes. They both, however, achieve the same insidious goal of neocolonialism - which has far dastardlier consequences for the citizens of the African countries than what transpired during the colonial era. 

 

The real coup in Africa occurs when the looting class who man the various African countries discard constitutional provisions guaranteeing people’s rights and those related to Presidential tenure limits, renege on governmental responsibilities towards the citizenry under the social contract theory and institutionalize bad governance, corruption, and vendetta as cardinal principles of the nation state. The silence of regional, continental, and international multi-state organizations to these aberrations, which diminish the citizens of African countries, convinces Africans that alternate templates for liberation and development must be adapted. Fed up with the pretense at democracy without any positive add-ons to the lives of the people, and denied of any meaningful path towards effecting necessary changes to the leadership of their countries via the ballot box, the emasculated populations are primed, ready and prepared to support any and all change in the status-quo - changes with respect to government! 

 

Having effectively gauged the socioeconomic environment, and the likelihood of mass support for a putsch, with public show of force, in the form of motorized convoys of military hardware, and troops taking over major parts of the national capital - a  staccato of bullets rendering the peace of night, and terse broadcasts in local media announcing the sacking of the corrupt regimes, closure of all border entries and the airspace -  a group of soldiers readily steps in,  promising to right wrongs, better the lot of the citizens, and lead their country to Eldorado. The severely abused and maligned citizens of the African countries readily troop out onto the streets to welcome their newfound ‘messiahs.’ 

 

In the course of the past three years, starting from 2020, sub-Sahara Africa seems to have cruised into a season of coups, with soldiers (renegade or patriotic, depending from which perspective one views the situation), with a rapidity that was last witnessed in the continent over thirty years ago, staging a total of eight coups and counter coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger and most recently Gabon. The coups, with the sole exception of the coup in Sudan, occurred in countries which had continued to reel under the stranglehold and economic exploitation of France. 

 

Blindsided by the rapidity of the collapse of its stooges in West Africa, France was left flatfooted with the swiftness with which it lost control of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the ridicule it was exposed to when its former victim- States ordered France to pull out French military bases off their territories. Faced with the obvious economic collapse, its loss of the freebies it raked in from outlandish exploitation of its colonial outposts, the French Government in Paris delved into childish tantrums, threatening hell and brimstone, when yet another coup occurred in its former territory, the Republic of Niger, from which France dubiously appropriated uranium and gold deposits.  

 

Realizing the existential threat it was faced with, if it lost the vice-like grip it had over a source from which she bolstered her gold reserves and the French economy, and the cheap uranium with which it lit up its homes and industries, France, in desperation to ensure that Niger does not remain out of its grip, reached out to known stooges it had long propped up in Senegal and Cote D’Ivoire. The Nigerian ruler, in a stark display of his inexperience and novice status in international relations, acting on the behest of the former colonial overlords and using the auspices of the regional multinational body, ECOWAS, issued a one-week ultimatum to the coup leaders in Niger, to reinstate the deposed French stooge, or face military invasion by some ECOWAS member States. 

 

Tinubu’s naivety

This unprecedented condescending ultimatum to an independent sovereign nation state,  backfired as it directly elicited patriotic fervor from Nigeriens, who thereafter trooped in their millions in support of their new Government. The position of the colonial overlords and their regional stooges masquerading under the ECOWAS tag was worsened when the Governments of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso vowed support for the Government in Niger and concretized their support by moving in troops and armaments in support of the new regime in Niger .

 

The fact that the Nigerian ruler who was spearheading efforts at ‘restoring democracy’ in Niger was himself a product of electoral heist tantamount to a coup, as earlier mentioned, and had not been able to stem the rising waves of banditry and extremist Islamist terror attacks in Nigeria, exposed  deeper non-altruistic and selfish efforts to deny a people the sense and  taste of success and freedom to ease themselves off the yoke of bad rulers. 

 

Whilst the Niger coup was approaching boiling point with the declaration by France that it would neither recognize the authority of the new rulers in Niger nor withdraw its Ambassador, as requested by the new regime, yet another group of military officers struck in Gabon, and sacked another dictator who was seeking to use the ruse of a ‘democratic elections’ to perpetuate his families’ chokehold on Gabon-  a  hold that had rendered the population of what ought to have been one of the richest countries in Africa, to destitution and backwardness. 

 

If the Niger coup, set alarm bells ringing, the Gabon coup soon thereafter, went into overdrive across the globe. Sit-tight dictators across Africa immediately embarked on mass sacks/retirement of senior generals in their military, replacing same with trusted cronies, and laboring under the illusion that with such cosmetic changes in the military, they will continue their vice hold over their population. Member states of the European Union likewise got quite startled about the sudden loss of stooges who had served to assure Europe of extremely cheap sources of gas, crude oil, and myriad other mineral resources. The EU leadership, sequel to the Gabon coup, immediately summoned a meeting of their foreign and defense ministers, to harmonize actions to confront the desire by African countries to be free. 

 

The usual condemnation of coups in Africa, such as announcement of the suspension of the ‘erring State’, and measured sanctions were announced by the Africa Union, and other Heads-of-States Clubs, also known as sub-regional multinational organizations in Africa, were reeled out after each of the 8 coup thus far in the course of the past 3 years – all to no effect whatsoever. These mundane reactions to coups by multi-State organizations must adapt to reality. If multi-State organizations wish to be taken seriously, then they ought to condemn bad governance as at when due, and not merely wait until the populations rescue themselves from vile regimes, to begin to pontificate about ‘constitutionalism.’ 

 

Where the next coup will take place: 

The reality which all must acquiesce to is that there is a new wave of decolonialization sweeping across Africa. The old order had terribly short-changed Africa, rendering the continent richest in mineral and natural resources, the poorest and most ravaged continent. Those who have benefited from the scam which has held Africa so backward over the past few decades, need only to realize that human beings with a quest for advancement and betterment of themselves, their environment and safeguarding their future, also inhabit the Africa continent. 

 

As the coup season continues, it is likely to, like a tornado, gather more momentum and intensity as it barrels across the continent. Thus far, the soldiers who had executed putsches over the past two years have remarkably been non-violent. Bets are now being wagered as to where the next ouster of despotic regimes masquerading as democracies will occur. Some countries which, by virtue of the disconnect between the regimes in power and their populations, level of large scale corruption, viciousness of the regimes in dealing with their populations and other criterion to assess good governance, can rightly be predicted as eminently qualified for a change of guards, include: Cameroon, Uganda, Senegal and Central African Republic. Others not too far behind include such territories as Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote D’Ivoire. Nigeria and Senegal have had very dubious election processes which led to imposition of unfit rulers over very vibrant populations. 

  

As the coup season unfolds, if coups were to take place in the aforelisted countries, the various international multi-State organizations (such as ECOWAS, AU, UN EU and others), which have not sufficiently urged for the adoption of good governance principles and the rule of law in the countries highlighted, will do their already damaged image a world of good, by refraining from the usual condemnations of coups and imposition of economic sanctions.

  

As further details of the change of governments emerged in Gabon, it has now been established that, fearing a change of government in Gabon, France had merely staged a pre-emptive coup in Gabon, replacing one stooge with another stooge, to ensure that control of Gabon and its huge oil reserves, stays under its control. Gabon thus remains on the list of  countries where the next coup could occur. 

 

 

 

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Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) in the French and Global Capitalist System*

 by Drs Assié-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo,

 Cornell University, New York


As a colonial power France aimed to exploit the resources of the colonized countries solely for its own development. Any real impact on the conditions of the natives in development projects were externalities, or an investment to make them perform better in their duties as laborers for colonial power. To achieve the goal, the natural and agricultural resources readily available at the time of colonization were to be exported toward the metropolis to feed its factories and meet the consumption needs of its population. This was the case for wild rubber and timber, as well as crops such as oil palm and cotton that provided raw materials for the French industrial sector. New crops, primarily coffee and cocoa, were introduced.


Effective economic exploitation required transport of goods and labor. Thus roads, railroads and harbors were designed and carried out at different stages during the colonial period. Several sea harbors and particularly the opening of canals linking the sea to the lagoons, especially the Vridi Canal and the construction of lagoon harbor in Abidjan increased drastically the water transportation capacity. The railroad of RAN (Régie Abidjan-Niger) was initially designed to run from south to north, from Abidjan across the middle of Côte d’Ivoire through Agboville, Dimbokro, Bouaké and Ferkessédougou (near Korhogo) to Burkina Faso through Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou and to Niger. The construction started in 1904 from Abidjan and reached Agboville in 1906, Dimbokro in 1910, Bouaké in 1912, Bobo Dioulasso in 1933, and Ouagadougou in 1955 (Samir Amin, p. 133). However, in the end, Ouagadougou became the final station although the initial name remained.

In addition to the transportation of commodities, the transport infrastructure, especially the railroad, served the specific purpose of carrying massive numbers of laborers from the northern part of Côte d’Ivoire and the Sahelian regions to plantations owned by the French colonial administration and the French settlers. Colonized African people in all the colonies, including people from the central and southern parts of Côte d’Ivoire, were subjected to the drastic and destructive policy of “forced labor” and thus were constantly forced to perform duties for the administration and settlers. Therefore, in the context of colonial rule, whether they came from far or near, Africans suffered equally under the policy of slave labor that was instituted. Large commercial farms similar to those in the settler colonies of Kenya, for instance, were established by the French to grow cocoa, coffee, rubber, pineapple, banana, oil palm, and coconut—in a word, cash crops—in the humid and most fertile section of the country. The large number of French-owned plantations underlies the current issues of land tenure in Côte d’Ivoire, although this delicate aspect has been carefully hidden behind the official concern for the rights of farmers from other African countries.

The north-south train brought the labor for those plantations. Later, when the Ivorian farmers also engaged in the cash crop economy, their need for labor could not be met by family members, as had been the case in the past for the food-crop economy. Since the African pre-colonial economy was basically a subsistence economy, the tax provided to the colonial administration in the beginning was in kind. However, to fully integrate its colonies in the world capitalist system for the maximization of colonial profit, it became necessary to create an economic base without which Africans could not become consumers of commodities produced by the French factories. Nor could they become taxpayers. Within the legalistic definition of the nation-state, taxpayers are also entitled to some rights. This was not the case in African countries during most of the colonial era. Thus, to generate the required money for the colonial administration's direct use, and also to make the Africans become consumers of manufactured products from the metropole, a cash crop economy was introduced by the administration. Thus, cotton and peanuts, for example, were for dryer regions, while coffee, cocoa, bananas, and palm trees were developed in the humid areas as the southern part of Côte d’Ivoire. Initially, considered by Africans as an integral part of the colonial system of exploitation the cultivation of cash crops was rejected by Africans. When forced to grow cocoa, for instance, some populations in the southeastern part of Côte d’Ivoire watered the plants with hot water in order to destroy them and then convinced the administration that such plants could not grow in their soil. African rejection of the crops was based on the fact that they could not consume those crops and that they served the interests of the colonists only.

Guinea-Conakry shared the same economic assets as Côte d’Ivoire. However, when Guinea under Sékou Touré rejected the French offer to become a member of the French Community and voted for its independence in 1958, France withdrew totally from Guinea and concentrated its efforts on the control of Côte d’Ivoire, which had become the “model” colony. The roots of neocolonial control and domination grew deeper and explain largely the current conflicts. Indeed, while internal contradictions constituted a convenient screen, the real determinants of the conflict was neocolonial control of the Ivorian economy on two fronts: the land/production issue and the control over commodities, including those produced by Ivorians for profit on the international market since deregulation neoliberal policies were implemented.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Ivorian growth rate was consistently among the highest in the world as, in 1971 for instance, it was second only to Japan with its +10.9% annual growth rate. Thus, following the Rostowian model of stages of economic growth (Rostow, 1971), Côte d’Ivoire was ready for take-off (Marchés Tropicaux, 1971). There was common reference to the Ivorian “miracle.” However, while indicating that even those who had a socialist ideology but were “interested in the future of the continent” should not “ignore this [Ivorian] experience” Samir Amin (op cit, p. 266) warned about the long-term negative impacts of some of the factors of this colonially designed and dependent economy when he stated:

This strategy of development was in effect based on priority accorded to the production of raw commodities for exportation … [T]he modes of financing of the Ivoirian economic growth will seriously encumber the future. The remuneration—at very high rates—of foreign capital, which has an absolute domination on the entire economy of the country, is an indicator of the external dependency of the growth. Côte d’Ivoire, like other territories during the colonial era, is quickly going from the stage of putting into value the local resources, characterized by a net input of external capital, to the stage of exploitation characterized by a reversed flow, as the profits expatriated profits exceed the inflow of external capital.… The Ivoirian experience reminds us that the possibilities of foreign capital are not exhausted. But it is important to know that these possibilities are limited and do not depend on African governments, but rather on objective economic laws.

These warnings sadly became a reality with the economic crisis of the 1980s and the continued transfer of profits by expatriates and foreign corporations, which have contributed to low and even negative growth rates.

The second aspect is the rush to acquire and maintain control over the hitherto state-owned agencies which followed the imposed privatization programs. Although they were officially “up for grabs,” Côte d’Ivoire being at the center of the French “pré carré,” the French companies have not been willing to see non-French competitors in their territory. The struggle for political leadership is directly related to the actual or perceived protection of French control that the different Ivorian leaders can offer, to continue privatization and a preferential treatment of the French even when Côte d’Ivoire could gain by considering other offers, for instance in diversification of trade relations and investment codes. Furthermore, the conditions must be right to ensure the security of the French and a prosperous economic investment. These are key variables in the power struggle that is fueling the conflicts.

On the agricultural front, two dimensions should be examined: the search for maximum profit over the commercialization of the current major crops, especially cocoa, amidst the new trade agreement of the globalized economy; and the old class of French landlords who acquired large portions of the land in the southern part of the country often in obscure contexts, with no proper or convincing legal papers stipulating, for instance, the duration of the lease. This class is adamantly opposed to any land reform that would jeopardize their chance for continued control and transfer of these lands to their descendants, wherever they live.

The current issues of land and property ownership as indicated earlier given the fact that Côte d’Ivoire is a settler colony de facto where the population from the former colonial power has increased since independence and the search for monopoly over the privatized farms and businesses have contributed to the sharpening of the nature of the conflict. It is worth recalling that the process of formation of the contemporary popular movements and their transformation into political parties, some of which are still key players in Ivorian politics, started with the protest of Ivorian farmers against the colonial policy of setting a lower price for the Ivorian-produced commodities, regardless of quality. Control over prices and profit continues to be at the center of the conflicts. An article by Agence France Press dated January 13, 2003 is entitled: “Le cessez-le-feu en Côte d’Ivoire apaise les cours du cacao (Ceasefire in Côte d’Ivoire Calms Cocoa Prices). With deregulation, many companies that have the financial means have been freely engaged in the purchasing and selling of agricultural commodities hitherto controlled by the state-owned agricultural commodities board, Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Productions Agricoles. These companies (some of which are not French) can make a profit if they purchase the commodities at a low price and sell them at a high price on the international market. Information about a real or artificial scarcity can drastically increase the price, thereby increasing the profit for those who are involved in the trade of the commodities. Since Côte d’Ivoire produces more than 40 percent of the cocoa in the world, the state of its production drastically affects the markets.

There has been a rush to acquire and control the hitherto state-owned agencies that, in the context of the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (the SAPs) have been privatized and that have been literally up for grabs for those who can buy the shares. Given the lack of savings and the weak financial capacity of the struggling middle class, which has been further weakened by the economic crisis and decreased purchasing power, these opportunities for participation are out of reach. A few French companies, such as Bouygues and Bolloré have had the lion’s share that they are not willing to concede to other companies when contracts come up for renewal. It is in their vital interest to have Ivorian authorities that are willing to facilitate their control and profits.

It is worth mentioning that Mr. Michel Camdessus, a Frenchman who was the president of the IMF during the last term, when Alassane Ouattara was vice-president of the IMF, is currently serving as adviser to the French president Jacques Chirac. Of the members of the political parties and groups in Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, an unabashed advocate of IMF policies and an ideologue of the theology of neo-liberalism, and his current wife, a French businesswomen solidly connected with business lobbies, offer the best guarantee to satisfy the conditions for security and profit for the French government, corporations, settlers, and small-enterprise owners who can have a lifestyle of comfort they cannot afford or even imagine to have in France .

Côte d’Ivoire is the first commercial partner of France in the Franc zone, and the third in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa and Nigeria. France is the first foreign investor in Côte d’Ivoire. 27 percent of the assets of the Ivorian enterprises are owned by French enterprises. 240 subsidiaries and more than 600 companies belong to French businessmen. This represents 1/3 of the investment stock and 68% of direct foreign investments. The strong and diversified representation in all the economic sectors has however been slowed down by the events at the end of 1999, the military coup, and the political and economic crisis of the last two years (France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2002, p. 8).

Côte d’Ivoire represents the “immortal” presence of France and its arrogance on African soil. There are no actions too embarrassing to preserve the status quo. The reactions of the youth, women, workers in the streets, and in the general population is caused in large part by this anachronistic presence in an Africa that is claiming to be united in an African Union. The protestors are not simply members of FPI rallying around a manipulative Gbagbo. Just as the Ivorian people rallied around SAA when it was created, as the forum where they could express their opposition to the colonial situation, many are expressing their refusal to see France continue its neocolonial approach and process even when the people want a negotiated resolution to the problem. Many people are making a connection between the mission which had been entrusted to the rebels and their assumed or actual mentor, and a conspiracy to apply the programs of economic liberalism, which in the end even Houphouët-Boigny doubted.

While Ouattara was Prime Minister, the National Assembly strongly resisted the way the Structural Adjustment Program was adopted. The parliamentarians started to think in terms of accountability arguing that these measures would commit the people and country for the long-term, and that the assembly should discuss them. While Bédié was president of the national assembly, there was prelude to the Bédié/Ouattara struggle, a contest which today has grown to disturbing proportions.

Under Ouattara’s term as Prime Minister, several aspects of the SAP’s were applied, including the profoundly unjust policy of applying two different salary scales of 1:2 for teachers of the same qualifications. Thus teachers, as state employees, and students were directly targeted by the SAPs. The prescribed measures included early retirement, dismissal of some state employees, and freezing of recruitment in the state sector (teaching staff from primary to upper levels, and public officers in state organizations). Others measures were the reduction or elimination of services to students (scholarships, housing, transport, and health services); mandated payment for the use of public services, including primary healthcare; restricted access to basic education; and cessation of any subsidy to farmers (as also recommended by the World Trade Organization).

Foundation Bibliography

Amin, Samir 1967. Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire, Paris, les Éditions de Minuit
Assié, N. T. (1975). Economie de plantation et changements socio-économiques en pays Baoulé, Lyon, France: Unpublished MA Thesis
________________ (1982). “Educational Selection and Social Inequality in Africa: The Case of the Ivory Coast,” unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
Assié-Lumumba, N. (1994). “Rural students in urban settings in Africa: The experience of female students in secondary school” In N. P. Sromquist. Education in urban areas: Cross-national dimensions (199-218). Westport, CT; London: Praeger
________________ (1996). Les Africaines dans la politique: Femmes Baoulé de Côte d’Ivoire, Paris: L’Harmattan
________________ (forthcoming, 2003). “Structural Change and Continuity in the African Family: the Case of Côte d’Ivoire” in Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi and Baffour K. Takyi (eds.) African Families at the Turn of the 21st Century, Greewood Publishing Group, Westport, CT.
Assié-Lumumba, N. T. & Lumumba-Kasongo, T. (1991). Les migrations inter-rurales liées à l’économie de plantation et leur impact sur la scolarisation primaire en Côte d’Ivoire: le cas de la bocule du cacao. Rapport soumis au programme des petites subventions, Dakar: CODESRIA
________________ (1991b). “Economic Crisis, State and Educational Reforms in Africa: the Case of Côte d'Ivoire,” in Mark B. Ginsburg (ed.) Educational Reform in International Context: Ideology, Economy and the State, New York, Garland Publishing Inc.
________________ (1994). “Dependency and Higher Education Organization in Africa: The Case of the National University of Côte d'Ivoire,” the Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, University of Houston, Monograph Series, 93/2
Chaffard, Georges (1965). Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation, Paris: Calman-Levy
France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2002)“Données générales et relations bilatérales avec la Côte d’Ivoire, dernière mise à jour: 01/10/02”, Paris
Ki-Zerbo, Joseph (1972). Histoire de l'Afrique Noire, d'hier à demain, Paris: Hatier
Kobben, A. (1956). Le Planteur Noir, Abidjan: IFAN
Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi, (1991). Nationalistic ideologies, their policy implications, and the struggle for democracy in African politics, Lewiston, N.Y., USA : E. Mellen Press
_________________ (1994). Political Re-mapping of Africa: Transnational Ideology and the Re-definition of Africa in World Politics, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America
_________________ (1998). The rise of multipartyism and democracy in the context of global change : the case of Africa, Westport, Conn.: Praeger
Mundt, Robert. J. (1972). Family structure, polity, and law: the implementation of the civil code in the Ivory Coast. Unpublished P.D. Thesis. Stanford: Stanford University
Nkrumah, Kwame (1963). Africa Must Unite, New York: F.A. Praeger
Zolberg, Aristide R. (1969). One-party government in the Ivory Coast, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Georges Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1965), p. 45.

Film and Politics in Africa: Call for Abstracts and Papers

 

Concept Note

Film is a significant tool due to its deployment of sounds, images, text and actualities that mirror people and societies everywhere. It reflects human society, in terms of its past, present, and future. Also, film evolved from African cultural expressions in the form of festivals, rituals, and dance performances and drama. The pioneering African dramatists, playwrights, filmmakers and cultural practitioners are testaments to this evolution process of and transformation into what is regarded as film today in African contexts. Harrow (2023) claims that the developments in African films, including the late 1980s and 1990s video revolution that birthed Nollywood and the streaming platforms occasioned by digital technologies in producing and distributing films in the 2010s and 2020s have inserted African film into the World Cinema as a commercial success.

He argues that the transformations have liberated African filmmakers and resulted in an incredible, enduring flow of creative, inventive, and thoughtful filmmaking (Harrow, 2023). Therefore, Harrow (2023) strongly believes that Nollywood has shifted the focus from engaging films, with social or political messages, to entertainment movies. While this may be true, several film cultures have emerged in the evolutionary intersections of cinematic expressions across the continent of Africa. We now have what is called Collywood (African films made in Cameroun or Camerounian languages), Ghallywood (African films made in Ghana or Ghanaian languages), Riverwood (African films made in Kenya or Kenyan languages),   Kannywood (Hausa films or films made in the Hausa language), among others, that dot and interject not only commerce but political issues across the African continent.

The idea of African film today is intertwined with the pre- and post-colonial history of every African being and nation. Though the central goal of film is entertainment, evidence has shown that film has been deployed for other different purposes. Thus, film has been used to play diverse roles in society like any communication medium such as information, education and entertainment. Politics is human and thus has found use for films to achieve some ends. Like any art form, film has been utilized to propagate culture and activism in the course of human history (Cantrell, 2020). On people’s political perceptions and attitudes, evidence reveals that films have proved effective (Eilders & Nitsch, 2015; Singh, 2018). Seeing films as politics of representation, Somwya (2022) believed that they can be used to reinforce societal stereotypical narratives instead of being liberating avenues for new thinking. The advent of technological transformation, the Internet, streaming platforms and social networking sites has changed the development of the African film industry. As a matter of fact, the rate at which African films have engaged in political events and themes is far ahead of the focus African scholars have devoted to African film industries. With the rate films are being churned out in Africa, there is a need for constant scholarly engagement with this momentum, considering the influence of films on Africans’ perceptions of themselves and their respective African societies.

Salami-Agunloye (2023) asserts that world leaders have exploited the power of films, politically, socially and economically. Leaders like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, for example, successfully used films as propaganda tools during World War II (Belton, 1996). This shows the power of film in influencing, transforming and changing attitudes, behavior and perception.  In addition, over a century ago, D. W. Griffith utilized the enormous power of film in his highly successful film The Birth of a Nation (Darity, 2008), as a medium to influence public opinion. It was largely successful because it captured the social and cultural tensions of the era. More recently, films like Hotel Rwanda (2004), about the 1994 Rwandan genocide were successful for the same reason. Similarly, during the 1890s until 1920, with the growth of industrialization in American culture, there was a big shift in the urban areas; American culture experienced a period of rapid industrialization. Films were creatively employed to convey stories embedded with American tastes, desires, customs, speech, and behaviour which were screened in these urban areas. The aim was to erode regional differences and create a more homogenized and standardized culture.

In Africa in particular, film has, since colonial times facilitated various forms of political schemes. History has it that the colonial master deployed film-based propaganda as one of their strategic tools to naturalize the myth of the white man’s burden on the continent. In French colonies in particular, this colonial master also used various film-related policies to entrench the Whiteman’s domination and to even sacralize Africa’s continuous dependence on the West – particularly France – for funds, technical support and even artistic creativity (Haynes & Okome, 1997; Ihidero, 2020; Tomaselli, 2021). Similarly, many post-independence African filmmakers such as Ousmane Sembene, Tunde Kelani, Paulin SoumanouVieyra, Peddie Okao and Jean Marie Teno, among other proponents of the Third Cinema movement, sought to mobilize cinema and film-related activities to militate against issues such as neo-colonialism, cultural genocide and bad governance in Africa (Tomaselli & Eke, 1995; Haynes, 1997; Omoera & Anyanwu, 2020). To these multiple examples of film-based activism, one may add the plethora of politically committed filmmakers who today express or represent the voice of Africa, and sometimes rebrand the continent on the international stage. Thus, cinema has since its coming to the African continent, been a political or politicized tool.   

In Africa, film has been involved in deepening political consciousness, political mobilization, peacebuilding, conflict communication, advocacy, and political communication for development for over a century.  Today, film's influence has grown exponentially, ostensibly because of the emergence of digital technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). In this book collection, we seek contributions from established and growing scholars, researchers, and practitioners of African film on the variegated involvement and intersections between film and politics in various regions of Africa, with a view to improving the parlous state of affairs. Their contributions can emanate from the following sub-themes or anyone related to the main theme:

 

Sub-Themes

African Films and Politics with respect to:

 

  • historical developments
  • popular cultural movements
  • peacebuilding
  • digital technologies
  • artificial intelligence (AI)
  • cultural Revolution
  • aesthetics
  • filmmakers
  • migration
  • governance
  • corruption
  • terrorism
  • education
  • gender
  • the creative economy
  • Generation Z
  • militarism and military governments
  • democracy
  • human rights
  • religion
  • AIKS
  • and language
  • ethnic consciousness
  • futurism
  • the (neo)colonial propaganda
  • identity
  • film policymaking in Africa
  • environmental politics
  • international geopolitics
  • political propaganda
  • cultural diplomacy
  • globalization and national branding

 

Submission Procedure

Abstracts of not more than 400 words and brief authors’ bios can be submitted to the following email addresses on or before December 15, 2023: ia.fadipe@acu.edu.ng, osakueso@fuotuoke.edu.ng, floribertendong2019@gmail.com Notifications of acceptance or rejection will be given by January 15, 2024.  Authors of accepted abstracts will be invited to submit their full chapters by May 30, 2024. The 7th edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) referencing style should be used. The font should be Times New Roman 12 and the word count should be a maximum of 6000. The book will be published by Routledge.

 

References

Cantrell, J. (2020). The relationship between implicitly political films and political

polarization. Journal of Student Research, 9(1), 1-10.

Belton, J. (Ed). (1996). Introduction to movies and mass culture. Rutgers University Press.

Darity, W. (2008). A “birth of a nation.” Encyclopaedia of the social sciences, 2nd ed. Gale

Virtual Reference Library, 1, 305-306.

Eilders, C. & Nitsch, C. (2015). Politics in fictional entertainment: An empirical classification

of movies and TV series. International Journal of Communication 9, 1563–1587

Harrow, K. W. (2023).  African cinema in a global age. 1st edition. Routledge.

Haynes, J. (1997). Nigerian cinema: Structural adjustments. In J. Haynes & O. Okome (Eds.),

Cinema and social change in West Africa (pp.1-25). Nigerian Film Corporation.

Haynes, J. & Okome, O. (1997). Evolving popular media: Nigerian video films. In J. Haynes

& O. Okome (Eds.), Nigerian video films (pp.21-44).Nigerian Film Corporation.

Ihidero, V.O. (2020). Postcolonial anxieties and the politics of identities in Genevieve Nnaji’s

Lionheart: A contrapuntal analysis.Nigerian Theatre Journal: A Journal of the Society of Nigerian Theatre Artists, 20(1), 1-15.

Omoera, O.S.  & Anyanwu, C. (2020). Politics of succession in Nollywood films, Saworoide

and Ikoka. CINEJ Cinema Journal, 8(1), 185-217.  https://doi.org/10.5195/cinej.2020.266

Salami-Agunloye, I (2023). Women in Nollywood industry: Reconstructing the cultural

environment. In O. S. Omoera, B. Ojoniyi, & V. O. Ihidero (Eds.), One tree a forest: studies in Nigerian theatre poetics, technology and cultural aesthetics. National Theatre.

Singh, V. (2018). Role of media and usage of films and documentaries as political tool. Journal

of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research, 5(6), 210-218.

Somwya, A. (2022). Politics of representations in cinema and recent interventions.

International Journal of Innovation Research in Technology, 9(1), 1205-1211.

Tomaselli, K. G. (2021). Africa, film theory and globalization: Reflections on the first ten years of the

Journal of African Cinemas. Journal of African Cinemas, 13(1), 3-28.

Tomaselli, K. & Eke M. (1995). Perspectives on orality in African cinema. Oral Tradition, 10 (1),

111-128.

Osakue S. Omoera, Ph.D., FIMIM, M.Sonta

Department of English and Communication Studies
Faculty of Humanities, Federal University Otuoke,

Bayelsa State, Nigeria

Founding Editor, Otukpa: A Journal of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Federal University Otuoke

+2348035714679

Editor, IJCRH Website: https://crhjournals.org/

Emails:omoera@yahoo.com; osakueso@fuotuoke.edu.ng