Vol. XXXII, Issue 1: Winter 2025 Boko Haram; Nigerian Protest Movements; Ghana and the African Diaspora

Table of Content

Editorial

Samuel Oduyela:  The Genesis, Ideological Conflicts and Fragmentation of Boko Haram

Uzo Ngoladi:  End SARS VS End- Bad - Governance  Protests in Nigeria: A Socio-Economic Comparison 

Steiner Ifekwe: Ghana and the African Diaspora, 1957 -1972 

Editorial

Nigeria has been the unwilling host of protest movements and Jihadist insurgencies in recent times. In this issue of Africa Update , two scholars analyse the socio-economic contexts and material basis underpinning these activities. Professor Oduyela traces the rise of Mohammed Ali, Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, following the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Shekau's militant, aggressive attack on civilians, and institutions such as schools, markets, and places of worship contrasted with the relatively gradualist pragmatic and welfarist approach of Mohammed Yusuf. Inspired by socio-economic conditions of poverty and marginalization as well as Salafist ideology and a quest to establish Sharia Law and an Islamic State, the movement under Abubakar Shekau succeeded in terrorizing citizens of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region for a decade. He died in 2021 but the jihadist movement continues to evolve. Professor Oduyela argues, in this illuminating and lucid article, that counter-terrorism measures would be enhanced by informed understanding of the ideological and motivational contexts of violent movements such as Boko Haram.

In the case of the popular insurrections that are now commonly known as EndSars , and EndBadGovernance, Dr. Ngoladi explains similarities not only in the root causes for the movements, but also the reaction of the Nigerian state to the protests. One major difference may be in the initial circumstances leading to the EndSars Movement, namely, individual acts of police brutality. EndBadGovernance addresses a broader range of issues that evolved over decades. Corruption, and the government's failure to meet the basic needs of its citizens is at the root of this protest movement. He argues that EndBadGovernance is less about individual incidents and more about “systemic failure.” 

Close reading of the articles of Oduyela and Ngoladi suggests that there is a tenuous link between the rise of Boko Haram and movements such as EndBadGovernance, namely, the failure of the Nigerian nation state to bring about economic equality and equitable distribution of resources, but whilst Boko Haram is steeped in Salafist ideology and religious fundamentalism, EndbadGovernance is secular, and unfettered by calls for the imposition of Islamic Shariah Law and theological injunctions. A point of convergence may lie in the fact that police brutality accelerated the rise of Boko Haram after 2006, with the assassination of Mohammed Yusuf, whilst outrage against police brutality spawned the EndSars protest movement.

The African Diaspora is the focus of Dr. Bernard Ifekwe. His basic argument is that one of the great legacies of Kwame Nkrumah is his collaboration with key revolutionaries of the African Diaspora as they sought to free themselves from the shackles of racism and discrimination. His illuminating writings influenced key activists, and his influence prevailed after his overthrow, during his exile in Guinea and beyond. The author points out that the study of Africa, and African Studies as a discipline, should also be counted among the significant legacies of the great pan-Africanist. 

We thank the contributors to this issue of Africa Update for their illuminating and incisive perspectives. 

Professor Gloria Emeagwali 
Chief Editor, Africa Update 
CCSU 

The Genesis, Ideological Conflicts and Fragmentation of Boko Haram

Samuel Oduyela, Blinn College, Bryan, Texas, USA

1. Introduction

Boko Haram is one of the most notorious terrorist organizations in Nigeria, responsible for widespread violence, displacement, and destabilization across the Lake Chad Basin. While Mohammed Yusuf is often cited as the founder of the group, this narrative overlooks the foundational role of Mohammed Ali, whose ideological vision and early activities laid the groundwork for Boko Haram's emergence. Ali's influence on Yusuf and the eventual transformation of the group into a globally recognized jihadist movement highlights the complex origins of Boko Haram.

This article seeks to debunk the misconception that Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram, asserting instead that Mohammed Ali was its true founder. It traces the roots of the group, examines the ideological split between Ali and Yusuf, and explores how Yusuf's leadership elevated Boko Haram to prominence. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a nuanced analysis of Boko Haram's evolution and its implications for counterterrorism strategies.

2. The Roots of Boko Haram

2.1 Historical Context

Boko Haram emerged within a complex socio-political and economic context that made northeastern Nigeria particularly susceptible to radical movements. The region has long suffered from chronic poverty, high unemployment rates, and low levels of education, creating fertile ground for discontent and social unrest. Marginalized by decades of neglect from both colonial and postcolonial administrations, northern Nigeria lagged behind the southern regions in terms of infrastructure, political representation, and access to economic opportunities. These systemic inequities fostered a deep sense of alienation among the region's population, particularly among its youth, who became easy targets for radicalization.

The rise of Salafi ideologies in the late 20th century further compounded this volatile environment. Influential clerics like Shaykh Mahmud Abubakar Gumi popularized strict interpretations of Islam, which rejected Western education and secular governance as incompatible with Islamic principles. This ideological shift resonated with communities already disillusioned by the failures of Nigeria's secular state, laying the groundwork for movements like Boko Haram. Against this backdrop, Mohammed Ali began his activities, which would eventually lead to the establishment of Boko Haram.

2.2. The Founding of Boko Haram

The widely accepted narrative that Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram obscures the pivotal role of Mohammed Ali, a radical Salafi cleric whose vision and leadership marked the group's genesis. Inspired by jihadi literature and ideologies that advocated the rejection of secular governance, Ali sought to establish a movement that would resist Nigeria's secular state and create an Islamic society governed by Sharia law.

Ali's charismatic preaching and unwavering commitment to his ideological goals allowed him to attract a loyal following, particularly among marginalized and disillusioned youths in northeastern Nigeria. Among his early converts was a young Mohammed Yusuf, who would later rise to prominence as the leader of Boko Haram. Yusuf's radicalization under Ali's mentorship was a critical turning point for the movement. While Ali focused on jihadist teachings and immediate confrontation with state authorities, Yusuf absorbed and adapted these principles, eventually shaping them into a broader strategy for mass recruitment and community engagement. 

Ali's leadership was marked by a separatist vision that culminated in the establishment of the Kannama commune in Yobe State in 2003. This community sought to live under strict Islamic law, rejecting the Nigerian government's authority and attempting to create a model Islamic society. The commune's eventual destruction by state security forces, along with Ali's death, created a leadership vacuum that Yusuf would later fill, transforming Boko Haram into a mass movement. However, Ali's foundational role as the architect of Boko Haram's ideological framework remains critical to understanding the group's origins.

Ali's ideological and organizational efforts are often overshadowed by Yusuf's later prominence, but it was Ali who laid the groundwork for Boko Haram's eventual rise. His rejection of Nigeria's secular state and his commitment to creating a puritanical Islamic society provided the foundational vision that would drive Boko Haram's activities, even after his death. Understanding Ali's contributions is essential for reconstructing the history of Boko Haram and debunking misconceptions about its origins.

3. The Split Between Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Yusuf

3.1. Key Differences in Ideology and Strateg

The ideological split between Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Yusuf represents a pivotal moment in the evolution of Boko Haram. Ali's vision was deeply rooted in the principles of immediate jihad and the establishment of an Islamic state through direct confrontation with Nigeria's secular government. His strategy was uncompromising, advocating for immediate separation from the state and the creation of an Islamic society governed by sharia law. Ali viewed the secular state as inherently illegitimate and believed that violent resistance was the only viable means to achieve his goals.

In contrast, Yusuf adopted a more pragmatic approach, emphasizing the importance of ideological consolidation and mass recruitment. While Yusuf agreed with Ali on the ultimate objective of establishing an Islamic state, he believed that immediate confrontation with the Nigerian government was premature and unsustainable. Yusuf focused on building a broad base of support by engaging in public preaching, organizing educational programs, and appealing to marginalized communities. His approach sought to strengthen the movement's ideological foundations and expand its influence before engaging in large-scale confrontations with the state.

The divergence between Ali and Yusuf became particularly evident in their debates over whether Muslims could coexist within a secular framework. Ali rejected the notion outright, arguing that secularism was incompatible with Islamic principles and governance. Yusuf, while equally critical of Nigeria's secular system, advocated for strategic patience, suggesting that gradual infiltration of state institutions and society would be a more effective path toward achieving the group's goals.These debates revealed a fundamental difference in their strategic priorities, ultimately leading to a fracture within the group.

3.2. The Establishment of Kannama Commune

Ali's commitment to immediate jihad culminated in the establishment of the Kannama commune in 2003. Located in Yobe State, the commune was envisioned as a separatist Islamic community that would operate independently of the Nigerian government. Ali and his followers sought to create a society governed entirely by Islamic law, free from the corruption and influence of the secular state. The commune became a hub for radical teachings and militant activities, attracting individuals who shared Ali's vision of a puritanical Islamic society.

The establishment of the Kannama commune marked a turning point in the trajectory of Boko Haram. Ali's decision to create a separatist enclave brought the group into direct conflict with Nigerian authorities. Tensions escalated as the commune's activities drew the attention of local law enforcement, leading to a series of confrontations. In December 2003, security forces raided the commune, resulting in violent clashes that left several members of the group dead.

The destruction of the Kannama commune and the death of Mohammed Ali in 2004 dealt a significant blow to the movement. However, it also created an opportunity for Mohammed Yusuf to rise as the group's new leader. Yusuf capitalized on the vacuum left by Ali's death, returning to Maiduguri and rebranding the group with a broader vision and a more strategic approach. Under Yusuf's leadership, Boko Haram shifted its focus from separatist enclaves to mass mobilization, public preaching, and ideological indoctrination, setting the stage for its later prominence.

The ideological split between Ali and Yusuf highlights the internal tensions that shaped Boko Haram's early development. Ali's uncompromising vision and militant strategies laid the groundwork for the group's radical identity, while Yusuf's pragmatic approach enabled it to expand its influence and sustain its activities over time. This dynamic underscore the complexity of Boko Haram's origins and the interplay between differing strategies within the same movement.

4.  Mohammed Yusuf's Leadership

4.1. Yusuf's Return to Nigeria

Following Mohammed Ali's death in 2004, Mohammed Yusuf saw an opportunity to redefine the group's mission and reestablish its presence in northeastern Nigeria. Unlike Ali's confrontational approach, Yusuf adopted a more strategic path, negotiating his safe return to Maiduguri after the collapse of the Kannama commune. This marked the beginning of Yusuf's rebranding of Boko Haram from a small, radical faction to a burgeoning mass movement with wide-reaching influence.

Yusuf's return coincided with a period of growing disillusionment among young people in northeastern Nigeria, driven by widespread poverty, unemployment, and the failure of the Nigerian government to address systemic inequalities. Yusuf capitalized on these grievances by positioning Boko Haram as the voice of the marginalized. His public preaching openly criticized the Nigerian state, condemning its corruption, secularism, and inability to improve the lives of its citizens. This messaging resonated deeply with the region's youth, many of whom saw Yusuf as a charismatic leader offering hope and purpose amid socio-economic despair.

4.2. Yusuf's Strategy and Vision

Under Yusuf's leadership, Boko Haram underwent a transformation in both structure and strategy. Yusuf established the Ibn Taimiyyah Islamic complex in Maiduguri, which served as the movement's central hub. This complex was more than a place of worship; it functioned as a school, recruitment centre, and ideological training ground. Yusuf used the complex to deliver sermons that combined Islamic teachings with sharp critiques of Western education (hence the name “Boko Haram,” loosely translated as “Western education is forbidden”) and the failures of the Nigerian government.

Yusuf's ability to articulate societal grievances in relatable terms made him a compelling figure for marginalized communities. He framed Boko Haram not just as a religious movement but as a socio-political revolution aimed at addressing the injustices faced by northern Nigerians. His leadership strategy focused on three key areas:

1. Preaching and Recruitment: Yusuf's sermons, often recorded and distributed widely, attracted followers from across the region and beyond. His ability to connect Islamic principles with everyday struggles gave Boko Haram a broad appeal, particularly among unemployed youth.

2. Community Engagement: Yusuf cultivated relationships with local communities, providing social services such as education and basic healthcare through the Ibn Taimiyyah complex.⁷ This created a sense of loyalty and dependence among the local population, further embedding Boko Haram within the socio-economic fabric of the region.

3. Ideological Indoctrination: Yusuf emphasized the indoctrination of followers into a strict Salafi interpretation of Islam, preparing them ideologically for future confrontations with the state.

However, Yusuf's rising influence did not go unnoticed by the Nigerian government. His public condemnation of state corruption and his growing base of followers made him a target for authorities. By 2009, tensions between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state reached a boiling point, culminating in a violent crackdown that led to Yusuf's capture and extrajudicial killing.

Yusuf's leadership was pivotal in transforming Boko Haram from a small, fragmented group into a significant socio-political force. While Mohammed Ali laid the ideological foundation, it was Yusuf's strategic vision and ability to connect with marginalized communities that propelled the movement into national and international prominence.

5. Boko Haram's Evolution Under Yusuf

5.1. Pre-2009 Phase: Proselytization and Radicalization

During the pre-2009 period, Boko Haram functioned primarily as a socio-religious movement under Mohammed Yusuf's leadership. Yusuf's ability to articulate grievances against Nigeria's secular governance and align them with Salafi interpretations of Islam attracted a growing base of followers, particularly among the unemployed and disenfranchised youth of northern Nigeria. The movement actively engaged in public debates with prominent clerics, many of whom opposed Yusuf's radical interpretations. One notable critic was Ja'afar Adam, an influential Islamic scholar who accused Yusuf of distorting Islamic teachings to justify rebellion against the state.

Yusuf's public confrontations with clerics like Adam not only solidified his position as a polarizing figure but also highlighted the ideological divide within Nigeria's Muslim community. While Adam and others advocated for coexistence within Nigeria's secular framework, Yusuf framed the secular state as an existential threat to Islam, urging his followers to reject it entirely. Yusuf's fiery sermons, distributed widely through audio recordings and DVDs, further fueled his popularity and amplified Boko Haram's reach. By 2008, Boko Haram had transformed from a local religious sect into a broader movement, gaining traction across several northern states.

This phase of proselytization and radicalization also saw the establishment of community programs under Yusuf's direction. The Ibn Taimiyyah Islamic complex served not only as a religious hub but also as a center for social services, including education and healthcare, which endeared the movement to local communities. This strategic blending of religious radicalism with social welfare initiatives allowed Boko Haram to embed itself deeply within the socio-economic fabric of northeastern Nigeria.

5.2. 2009 Uprising and Yusuf's Death

By 2009, the Nigerian government had grown increasingly wary of Boko Haram's activities, viewing Yusuf's growing influence as a threat to national stability. The tipping point came when members of Boko Haram clashed with police in Bauchi State over alleged violations of a motorcycle helmet law. This seemingly minor incident escalated into widespread violence, as Yusuf called on his followers to retaliate against the state.

The government's subsequent crackdown on Boko Haram resulted in a series of violent confrontations across northeastern Nigeria, culminating in the destruction of the Ibn Taimiyyah Islamic complex in Maiduguri. Yusuf was captured during the raids and later killed extrajudicially while in police custody. His death was a pivotal moment for Boko Haram, marking the end of its socio-religious phase and the beginning of its transformation into a violent insurgency.

Following Yusuf's death, the group fractured briefly but was quickly reorganized under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's deputy. Shekau adopted a far more aggressive approach, abandoning Yusuf's gradualist strategy in favor of widespread violence and terror.Under Shekau, Boko Haram evolved into a full-fledged insurgency, targeting not only state institutions but also civilians, including schools, markets, and places of worship. This shift in tactics marked the beginning of a new and bloodier phase in the group's history.

The 2009 uprising and Yusuf's death underscored the Nigerian government's inability to address the underlying socio-economic and political grievances that had fueled Boko Haram's rise. While the government's heavy-handed response temporarily weakened the group, it also alienated local communities, many of whom viewed Yusuf's killing as unjust. This resentment provided fertile ground for Shekau's more militant iteration of Boko Haram to thrive.

6. Implications of the Ali-Yusuf Dynamic

6.1. Mohammed Ali's Founding Role

Mohammed Ali's role as the true founder of Boko Haram has often been overshadowed by the later prominence of Mohammed Yusuf. However, recognizing Ali's foundational contributions is critical for understanding the ideological underpinnings and early organizational structure of Boko Haram. Ali's vision of a puritanical Islamic state, coupled with his uncompromising stance against secular governance, set the stage for the group's radical identity. His teachings laid the groundwork for the movement's core beliefs, including the rejection of Western education and the pursuit of an Islamic state, which have remained central to Boko Haram's ideology.

Ali's influence also extends to the group's initial strategy of separatism and community-building, as demonstrated by the establishment of the Kannama commune. While his untimely death limited his ability to further shape the group, his legacy endured through the followers he mentored, including Yusuf. Reassessing Ali's role provides a clearer picture of Boko Haram's genesis and challenges oversimplified narratives that solely credit Yusuf with its founding. This understanding is essential for addressing the roots of radicalism in northern Nigeria.

6.2. Yusuf's Leadership and Boko Haram's Global Prominence

Under Mohammed Yusuf's leadership, Boko Haram transitioned from a localized separatist movement into a mass mobilization effort with national and international significance. Yusuf's strategic shift toward public engagement, preaching, and recruitment broadened the group's appeal, particularly among disillusioned youth. His establishment of the Ibn Taimiyyah Islamic complex symbolized this shift, functioning as both a religious hub and a recruitment center.

Yusuf's ability to articulate societal grievances in the context of Islamic teachings resonated deeply with marginalized communities, propelling Boko Haram into public discourse. His criticisms of state corruption and the failures of Nigeria's secular government positioned the group as a symbol of resistance for many in the region. While Yusuf's death in 2009 marked the end of his leadership, the foundation he built allowed Boko Haram to evolve under Abubakar Shekau into a globally recognized jihadist organization affiliated with groups like ISIS.

This dynamic between Ali's foundational role and Yusuf's expansionary vision underscores the interplay of ideology and strategy in Boko Haram's rise to prominence. Yusuf's leadership amplified the group's message and increased its influence, but it was Ali's groundwork that made such expansion possible.

6.3. Understanding the Roots for Counterterrorism

Acknowledging the distinct but complementary roles of Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Yusuf provides a more nuanced understanding of Boko Haram's origins and development. This perspective is invaluable for designing effective counterterrorism strategies that address not only the group's actions but also the conditions that enabled its rise. Socio-political factors such as poverty, inequality, and systemic neglect in northern Nigeria were instrumental in fostering the grievances that Boko Haram exploited.

Counterterrorism efforts must therefore go beyond military interventions to include initiatives that tackle these underlying issues. Investments in education, infrastructure, and economic opportunities are crucial for weakening the appeal of extremist ideologies. Similarly, fostering inclusive governance and addressing regional disparities can help mitigate the alienation that often fuels radicalization. By understanding the roles of both Ali and Yusuf, policymakers can develop more comprehensive approaches to countering extremism and preventing the emergence of similar movements in the future.

7. Conclusion

This article has challenged the dominant narrative that attributes the founding of Boko Haram solely to Mohammed Yusuf, arguing instead that Mohammed Ali was the group's true originator. Ali's radical vision of a puritanical Islamic state, his rejection of Nigeria's secular governance, and his establishment of the Kannama commune laid the ideological and organizational groundwork for Boko Haram's rise. While Yusuf's leadership undeniably propelled the group to national and international prominence, it was Ali's foundational efforts that shaped Boko Haram's early identity and strategic trajectory.

The dynamic between Ali and Yusuf highlights the interplay between ideological purism and strategic pragmatism within Boko Haram's evolution. Ali's uncompromising approach centered on immediate jihad and separatism, whereas Yusuf's emphasis on mass mobilization, public engagement, and ideological consolidation allowed the group to expand its influence and adapt to changing socio-political conditions. This nuanced understanding of the Ali-Yusuf dynamic underscores the importance of analyzing the origins of extremist groups to grasp their motivations and trajectories fully.

Recognizing these historical nuances has significant implications for counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad region. Effective strategies must go beyond military interventions and address the socio-economic and political conditions that have fuelled discontent in northern Nigeria. Poverty, unemployment, educational disparities, and systemic neglect remain key drivers of radicalization, and addressing these issues is essential for reducing the appeal of groups like Boko Haram. Moreover, acknowledging the ideological roots of Boko Haram underscores the importance of counter-narratives that challenge extremist ideologies and promote inclusive governance.

This study also contributes to broader academic and policy discussions on terrorism by demonstrating the need for historically grounded analyses. Simplistic narratives that overlook key figures like Mohammed Ali risk perpetuating misunderstandings about the nature of extremist groups and their drivers. By shedding light on the complex interplay of ideology, leadership, and socio-political context, this research provides a framework for understanding not only Boko Haram but also other insurgencies rooted in similar conditions.

In conclusion, the legacy of Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Yusuf offers critical lessons for addressing extremism in Nigeria and beyond. Understanding their roles and the socio-political environments in which they operated can inform more targeted, sustainable, and effective approaches to counterterrorism. By focusing on both the structural and ideological dimensions of extremism, policymakers and stakeholders can work toward addressing the root causes of insurgency and fostering long-term stability in the region.

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EndSARS VS EndBadGovernance Protests in Nigeria: A Socio-Economic Comparison 

Uzor Ngoladi, Athena Center for Policy and Leadership , Nigeria

Introduction 

Two movements - EndSARS and EndBadGovernance - have emerged as significant symbols of the people's demand for change. While the EndSARS movement initially focused on police brutality, it quickly evolved into a broader call for systemic reform, overlapping with the EndBadGovernance movement which emanated from a demand for improvement in leadership. This article seeks to explore the socio-economic implications of these two movements, highlighting their intersections, differences, and the potential pathways for sustainable development in Nigeria.

EndBadGovernance and Tinubu's government 

The five states of southeast Nigeria in a bid to register their dismay over perceived marginalization declined to participate in EndBadGovernance protests. Residents of southeast Nigeria ignored the protest after a call for boycott by the Pan Igbo socio-cultural organization, Ohaneze Ndigbo and went about their lawful economic activities during the 10-day protest from August 1 to August 10, 2024. There was protest empathy because the southeast believed that the APC led government had ostracized the region especially in terms of federal appointments and infrastructural development.

Other geopolitical zones in Nigeria witnessed massive turnout by young people for the protest. Properties were destroyed in the north of Nigeria with protesters in Kano waving Russian flags and calling for military takeover of the government. Police brutality which triggered EndSARS protests in 2020 reared its ugly head as many protesters were shot and killed by the police in Abuja and other parts of the country, despite the fact that a court restricted protesters to MKO Abiola Stadium. Police shot canisters and teargas at young people who dared to march at the Eagle Square, Abuja.

In Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta, Akure, Oshogbo, Ado-Ekiti and other parts of the southwest, economic activities were halted by irate protesters. They were harassed and manhandled by the police with some protesters losing their lives to police gunshots. Other victims of police highhandedness are still languishing in police cells till date. The trauma of EndSARS came alive as Nigerians took to the streets shouting: ‘Ebim kpami” meaning I am hungry. The oil rich south-south geopolitical zone was not left out in the EndBadGovernance agitation.

A jittery Federal government ignored the demands by the protesters especially as regards fuel subsidy removal and labelled them as the voice of opposition with intention to illegally takeover a democratically elected government.

The government unleashed mayhem on the protesters, first by mobilizing pro-government protesters to disrupt the protest march and repeatedly using the law enforcement agents to attack protesters. About 56 journalists were attacked, 2111 protesters were arrested and 1403 remanded in prison.

Recently, the Nigeria Labour Congress headquarters that supported the EndBadGovernance protests was raided by the police, and the National President, Joe Ajaero, was invited by the police for questioning on accusations of terrorism. Bank accounts of perceived sponsors of the protest were frozen by the federal government. 

Aides of President Tinubu including Bayo Onanuga released tweets blaming the Igbos and Peter Obi, as sponsors of the protest. Controversial social media influencer, Reno Omokri tweeted copiously, vilifying Peter Obi for instigating Nigerians to overthrow Tinubu's govt. Unlike the EndSARS protest that took former President Buhari's administration unawares, concerted efforts were made by Tinubu's Administration to stop the EndBadGovernance protest after organizers announced the date of commencement.

Who are the sponsors of the EndBadGovernance protest? 

The government's inadequate response to Nigeria's pressing issues has fueled widespread frustration and disillusionment among the populace, who have been repeatedly asked to ‘bear and persevere' by President Tinubu's administration, while the political elite continues to indulge in extravagance, seemingly oblivious to the people's suffering.

This stark contrast between the leadership's opulence and the citizens' struggles has further eroded trust and intensified discontent, culminating in the #EndBadGovernance protest, where Nigerians took to the streets, to demand an end to the status quo and call for a better future, free from corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency.

According to the EndBadGovernance protest arrowheads, here are their demands:

-Ending subsidy scams and reducing fuel prices to below ₦300 per liter.

-Reverting tertiary education fees to previous rates by reversing subsidies. 

-Restoring affordable electricity tariffs. 

-Reinstating previous import duty rates.

-Publicly disclosing and reducing the salaries and allowances of all senators, House of Representatives members etc. 

-The establishment of an emergency fund to support SMEs, reopening national borders, reforming the EFCC, declaring a state of emergency on inflation, and reforming the judiciary.

These socio-economic problems that have bedeviled Nigeria from time immemorial were the motivating factors for calling out protesters to the streets on August 1, 2024. 

EndSARS Movement and Buhari's government 

The EndSARS movement began as a social media campaign against the notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a unit of the Nigerian Police Force known for its human rights abuses, extortion, and extrajudicial killings. The movement gained global attention in October 2020 when peaceful protests erupted across Nigeria, drawing attention to not only police brutality but also broader issues of governance, corruption, and economic inequality.

EndBadGovernance, on the other hand, is a broader and more longstanding campaign that encapsulates the frustration of Nigerians with the systemic issues plaguing the country. These issues include corruption, inefficiency, lack of accountability, poor infrastructure, inadequate healthcare and education, and widespread poverty. While EndSARS was a catalyst for widespread activism, EndBadGovernance has been a persistent undercurrent in Nigerian society.

The #EndSARS protest was spontaneous under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration from October 8 to October 20 in year 2020. It was never an organized movement ab initio. It just occurred like every other revolution against the establishment. Young people in Nigeria were encountering untold brutality, extortion and exploitation from the Nigerian police. Impunity, bribery and corruption were institutionalized in the police rank and file. The average police officer can rape or kill without any consequences.

“I will kill you and nothing will happen” became the official mantra of the Nigeria police force. That is the reason I titled my book, #EndSARS: War Against Impunity.

The concept of #EndSARS Movement

The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) established in 1992 as a Nigerian Police Force unit to deal with crime and criminality associated with armed robbery and kidnapping deviated from the initial mandate.

SARS became a tool in the hands of the police to harass, intimidate and extort money from innocent young people who were often profiled as internet fraudsters and armed robbers. Any young person wearing tattoos or dreadlocks or perhaps dressed in designer apparels and driving a posh automobile was classified as a criminal by SARS officers. Many victims of these unscrupulous policemen were dispossessed of their finances and properties. Some of them eventually lost their lives via torture in illegal detention.

SARS maintained an unimaginable nuisance level until it was disbanded at the heat of #EndSARS protests in October 2020 by the Nigerian government who had been insensitive to the demands of young people who were at the receiving end of police brutality. After about two decades of crass impunity by the police, the killing of a young man whose car was stolen by SARS operatives in Delta State went viral on social media and activated massive protests in October 2020 across Nigeria. It was the last straw that broke the Carmel's back. 

Apart from advocating for holistic police reforms, EndSARS as a social construct is basically an advocacy for emancipation from the high-handedness and high-level corruption in the police system and the monstrous misrule of the government, past and present in Nigeria via civil disobedience and street protest.

The five-point demand by EndSARS protesters were as follows:

1. Immediate release of all arrested protesters.
2. Justice for all deceased victims of police brutality and appropriate compensation for their families.
3. Setting up an independent body to oversee the investigation and prosecution of all reports of police misconduct.
4. In line with new Police Act, psychological evaluation and re-training of all disbanded SARS officers before they can be redeployed.
5. Increase of police remuneration.

The hardship in Nigeria is numerous, hydra-headed and intractable. Basic electricity remains a mirage. The unemployment rate has skyrocketed to 33.3 percent as at April 2021 according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Millions of young university graduates wake up every day unemployed, underemployed and without a means of livelihood. These are youths who are in their productive age. 

I participated in #EndSARS protest accidentally when I ran into popular human rights activists, Omoyele Sowore and Aisha Yesufu at the police headquarters in Abuja with a mammoth crowd on Thursday October 8, 2020. I joined the protest as a concerned citizen in support of the aims and objectives. 

The following Saturday, I protested with over 20 thousand youths who marched from Berger overhead bridge through Unity Fountain and ended up at the Police Headquarters Abuja where the police shot teargas and sprayed hot peppery water on protesters and used all manner of force to stop the protest. I got involved in EndSARS protest because I have been a victim of police brutality on several occasions and it's never a palatable experience.

I also protested in Lagos State where soldiers shot and killed protesters who were seated on the floor, reciting the National Anthem and waving the Nigerian flags at the popular Lekki tollgate. For days, the Lekki-Epe Expressway was barricaded at several bus stops by protesting youths up to Lekki tollgate, the melting point of the dissent. CNN gave comprehensive media coverage to the Lekki tollgate mayhem and incurred the wrath of the Nigerian government who has consistently denied the incident. The unfortunate devastating destruction of private and public properties in Lagos State was executed by street urchins popularly known as area boys who were mobilized by government authorities to disrupt the otherwise peaceful protest.

Let's examine both protests under the following headlines:

Comparative Focus 

EndSARS: The EndSARS movement is rooted in specific incidents of police brutality and the youth's disenchantment with law enforcement. However, as protests grew, the movement began to address broader socio-economic issues such as unemployment, poor living conditions, and lack of opportunities for young people.

EndBadGovernance: This movement addresses a broader spectrum of issues that have plagued Nigeria for decades. It includes concerns over corruption, lack of transparency, poor service delivery, and the government's failure to meet the basic needs of its citizens. EndBadGovernance is less about individual incidents and more about systemic failure.

Economic Impact 

EndSARS: The economic impact of the EndSARS protests was immediate and profound. The protests disrupted business activities, led to the destruction of properties especially in Lagos State, and caused losses estimated in billions of naira. However, the movement also threw a light on the economic disenfranchisement of Nigerian youth, who represent a significant portion of the population but suffer from high unemployment rates.

EndBadGovernance: The economic implications of bad governance in Nigeria are far-reaching and deeply entrenched. Corruption and inefficiency have stifled economic growth, leading to poor infrastructure, inadequate healthcare, food inflation and a failing education system. The consequences of bad governance are seen in the high poverty rate, the brain drain, and the lack of foreign investment. EndBadGovernance is a call for the structural reforms needed to unleash Nigeria's economic potential. Destruction of properties was witnessed in northern Nigeria especially Kano State which is the melting point for out of school children and miscreants. The high poverty rate in northern Nigeria is unimaginable and has increasingly become unbearable under Tinubu's administration. EndBadGovernance protest was an opportunity for northerners to vent their displeasure of rising cases of food inflation, insecurity and decaying infrastructure.

Social Implications 

EndSARS: Socially, the EndSARS movement galvanized a generation of Nigerians, particularly the youth, to take an active role in demanding accountability and justice. It highlighted the power of social media as a tool for social change and fostered a sense of unity among Nigerians across ethnic and religious divides. The movement also exposed deep-seated issues of mistrust between the government and the governed.

EndBadGovernance: The social implications of bad governance are seen in the erosion of public trust in government institutions, the rise of ethnic and religious tensions, and the increasing sense of hopelessness among citizens. EndBadGovernance seeks to address these issues by advocating for transparency, accountability, and good governance, which are essential for social cohesion and national unity. The social media played a prominent role in creating awareness before, during and after the protest. 

Government Response 

EndSARS: The government's response to the EndSARS protests was initially dismissive, but as the protests gained momentum, the government announced the disbandment of SARS. However, this move was seen by many as superficial, as reports of police brutality continued. The government's heavy-handed response, including the alleged shooting of unarmed protesters at the Lekki Toll Gate, further eroded trust and highlighted the disconnect between the government and the people. President Buhari addressed Nigerians at the heat of the protest without actionable plans.

EndBadGovernance: The response to calls for ending bad governance has been largely characterized by rhetoric rather than action. While successive governments have pledged to tackle corruption and improve governance, tangible results have been limited. The persistence of corruption, poor service delivery, and lack of accountability continues to fuel discontent and undermine the legitimacy of the government. President Tinubu also addressed the nation without tangible outcomes. Many commentators including Nobel Laureate, Prof Wole Soyinka criticized Tinubu's nationwide speech for failing to address pertinent issues such as use of lethal force by security agencies to quell the protest. Soyinka condemned the use of live ammunition to disperse protesters and described it as old fashioned. 

Long-Term Implications 

EndSARS: The long-term implications of the EndSARS movement include a more politically aware and engaged youth population. The movement has also led to increased calls for police reform and accountability in governance. However, the success of these demands depends on sustained advocacy and the willingness of the government to implement meaningful reforms.

EndBadGovernance: The long-term implications of addressing bad governance are critical to Nigeria's future. Effective governance is essential for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and social stability. Without addressing the root causes of bad governance, Nigeria risks continued economic stagnation, social unrest, and a decline in the quality of life for its citizens.

Conclusion 

The EndSARS and EndBadGovernance movements, while distinct, are deeply interconnected in their calls for a more just, equitable, and prosperous Nigeria. EndSARS highlighted the immediate need to address police brutality, but it also underscored broader systemic issues that have long been the focus of the EndBadGovernance movement. For Nigeria to move forward, it is imperative that the government not only addresses the specific demands of EndSARS but also undertakes comprehensive reforms to tackle the underlying issues of bad governance.

The future of Nigeria depends on the ability of its leaders to listen to the voices of the people, particularly the youth, and to take bold steps towards creating a nation that upholds the principles of justice, equity, and good governance. Only through such efforts can Nigeria realize its full potential and secure a prosperous future for all its citizens.

References: 

Onuoha, M. M. (2021). Voices of dissent: The #EndSARS movement and the rise of youth activism in Nigeria . Lagos: Sunrise Publications.

Adichie, C. N. (2021). A time to speak: Nigeria's youth, protests, and the fight for accountability . New York: HarperCollins.

Ngoladi, U. (2020). #ENDSARS: War Against Impunity. Abuja: Strategia Blast International.

Amnesty International. (2020). Nigeria: Horrific reign of impunity by SARS highlights need for urgent police reforms . Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org

Akinbobola, Y., & Olofinlua, T. (2021). The #EndSARS Movement: Youth protests and the demand for accountable governance in Nigeria. African Studies Quarterly, 21 (2), 45-62.

Odinkalu, C. A., & Adekoya, M. (2021). Police brutality and the fight for social justice in Nigeria: A case study of #EndSARS . Policy Brief Series. African Center for Governance and Development.

Al Jazeera. (2020, October 20). Nigeria protests: What is the #EndSARS movement all about? Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com

BBC News. (2020, October 21). Lekki tollgate shooting: What really happened? Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com

The Guardian Nigeria. (2020, October 17). #EndSARS: Nigerian youths demand end to police brutality and bad governance. Retrieved from https://guardian.ng

GHANA AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA, 1957 - 1972 

Bernard Steiner Ifekwe, Department of History and International Studies

University of Uyo, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria

Introduction

This article examines Kwame Nkrumah's activities towards the African Diaspora in their cultural, political and educational spheres. It argues that there were two strands in Ghana's relationship with the African Diaspora. First, between March 1957 and February 1966, during Nkrumah's Presidency when he utilised the paraphernalia of office to address African Diaspora concerns in multiple spheres. Secondly, from 1966 to his death in 1972, while on exile in Guinea, when he utilised his works to support the African Diaspora struggles against discrimination and their political platforms such as the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the Black Power Movement (BPM).

When Ghana attained independence in March 1957, Nkrumah spoke about the “African personality in International Affairs” whereby the government and people of Ghana would work, alongside other sovereign nations to bring Africa into a global standing. ¹ After many centuries of Africa's degeneration from western exploitation through slavery, colonialism and imperialism, Africa would hopefully harness the potentials of her Diasporic relations to combat neo-colonialism. Nkrumah, in pursuit of this goal, thought and acted continentally, but using Ghana as the base of his operations. From 1966 until his death in 1972, Nkrumah from his base in Conakry, Guinea, reiterated the importance of African Diaspora relationship in African affairs.

Nkrumah targeted mostly the areas he called “reborn states” in this quest. These states were found in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean with shared values of being victims of colonialism and imperialism. ² As time went on, Nkrumah included Black individuals and their organizations in the United States as victims of successive political, economic and social exploitation by their governments and he, therefore, supported their protests for political and civil rights. ³

Nkrumah opined that it was during his sojourn in the United States that he decided to pursue a global struggle for the Black emancipation should he be empowered to do so later in his career. In his autobiography, he writes:

While in the University of Pennsylvania I helped to set up an African Students' Association of America and Canada. This was actually the beginning of my political activities in the United States. When I first arrived this Association was only a small gathering of African students who used to meet occasionally but who, because of lack of organisation were not strong enough to achieve anything effective. I arranged things so that the organisation took in not only the students but also Africans engaged in other types of work in the country. By this means I was able to bring them all together. At the first conference, I was elected president, a position I held until the day I left for England. ⁴ 

From the above perspective, Nkrumah gradually fashioned the direction of his political career. From students' politics to nationalist activities in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nkrumah laid his visions for Africa and the African Diaspora, in statements and political campaigns. His encounters with Black activists in the United States, and his readings of their works on Pan-Africanism, and his active participation in the 1945 Pan-African conference in Manchester, England, duly assisted him in the pursuit of co-ordinated Ghana relations with the African Diaspora at the height of his career. ⁵

The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Links with the African Diaspora 

Ghana under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah played a leading role in harnessing Ghana-African Diaspora relations during his active days in politics. His insistence on a working relationship with the African Diaspora blurred their differences with Africans by linking their past experience in slavery to a new paradigm where both groups should sustain a united struggle against colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism. Nkrumah espoused these in his numerous writings, statements, and press releases. 

Nkrumah's sojourn in the United States accorded him an opening to understand the importance of the African Diaspora in global affairs. He studied in America where he graduated in 1939 from Lincoln University, Oxford, Pennsylvania, in economics and sociology. He equally studied theology, and obtained postgraduate degrees in education and philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. As a lecturer, he taught political science at Lincoln University. ⁶ Many Black activists and intellectuals played a primary role in his later career Two schools of thought, notes his biographer, Basil Davidson were critical . According to him:

… the most influential [of this thought] held that black Americans had long since lost any connection they might once have had with Africa. Their future, on this view, could lie only in becoming so completely American, in all their ideas or ambitions, that white America would accept them as equal citizens. Africa, for this school of thought, was the “savage backwoods” of which Attoh Ahuma had written a quarter of a century earlier. Black Americans - or Negroes, as they then called themselves, adopting another white habit - could only worsen their chances of a decent life if they harped on any “African connection.” Better forget the Dark Continent, and its shameful stain, [they intoned]. ⁷ 

The second school of thought was most rewarding to Nkrumah's nascent ideas on the African Diaspora. As Davidson further explains:

The second school of thought held an opposite view. William Du Bois, Leo Hansberry and others had long argued that black people in America could realize their full humanity only if they accepted their African heritage. They should be proud of Africa and its history. And they would be proud of it, if only they knew what this history was. These men set out to study and to teach the history of Africa. If in a small way as yet, “Negro studies” also began to become “African studies”. ⁸ 

The two diametrical approaches in the understanding of the African Diaspora helped him to formulate his political thought in post-colonial Africa. Nkrumah opined that political education would be the key to building a relationship between Africa and the African Diaspora and charting a new form of development. By immersing himself in philosophy, history, sociology, law and other courses related to African Studies, Nkrumah changed the narratives about Africa's global predicament through publications, conferences, press interviews, among others. While doing so, he attracted African Diaspora scholars and activists to Ghana as lecturers and research fellows who taught in various institutions. Other Black activists and freedom fighters came to Ghana to see and study Nkrumah's ideas on the struggle against colonialism and racism. ⁹ In so doing, he created much awareness about a new Africa and was in the vanguard towards a new relationship with the African Diaspora.

Kwame Nkrumah's Presidency and His African Diaspora Relations 

Kwame Nkrumah's presidency of Ghana lasted from March, 1957 to February, 1966. It was a period when Ghana pursued a relentless policy on African unity through a concerted continental struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. Similarly, Ghana sought affinity in cultural, ideological and political praxis with the African Diaspora in what Nkrumah called African Revolution. Pan-Africanism was Ghana's major policy in these two directions. ¹⁰

Nkrumah's relations with the African Diaspora were an offshoot of the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England where he established himself as a prominent African leader. That conference attended by both Africans and African Diaspora, of all shades of opinion, was a pathway towards Black liberation. Nkrumah recalls his involvement with this 1945 Pan-African Congress thus:

When I arrived in England in 1945, after ten years in the USA, the first person I met was George Padmore, a West Indian journalist. He was then busily engaged, together with T. R. Makonnen and Peter Abrahams, in preparing for the Pan-African Congress due to be held in Manchester in October of that year. Within a week I had become joint secretary with Padmore of the Organization Committee. We worked long hours making arrangements for the Congress, and sending letters to various organizations throughout the world, explaining its purpose. ¹¹ 

Nkrumah drew closer to becoming an advocate of Black liberation, through the personalities he met, and the communiqués from the Congress. According to him:

The Congress was held under joint chairmanship of Dr. W. E. DuBois, an Afro-American scholar and one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples, and Dr. Peter Milliard, a doctor of medicine from Guyana. Two Declarations were addressed to imperial powers, one written by DuBois, and the other by myself. Both asserted the right and the determination of colonial peoples to be free and condemned capitalism. Colonial peoples were urged to organize into political parties, trade unions, co-operatives, and so on, in order to achieve their political freedom, and thereby to make possible economic improvement for the masses.After the Congress… colonial liberation movements were underway in Africa. But it was not until after Ghana's Independence in 1957 that Pan-Africanism moved to Africa, its real home, and Pan-African Conferences were held for the first time on the soil of a liberated African State. ¹²

In the quest for Ghanaian independence, Nkrumah was a major force in strategy and ideological orientation. His nationalist philosophy was called Positive Action anchored on the following methods:

1. Legitimate political agitation
2. Newspaper and educational campaigns and
3. As a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence. ¹³

Nkrumah adopted this strategy and pulled out colonial Gold Coast into an independent state of Ghana in March 1957. Meanwhile, as Nkrumah intensified his decolonization politics from Britain, many of his partners in the 1945 Pan-African Congress, particularly from the African Diaspora identified him as an African future leader. W. E. B. Du Bois, who worked with Nkrumah during the 1945 Congress, was one of them. Du Bois became involved in spearheading Ghana's relations with the African Diaspora during the colonial era. DuBois stoutly defended the Independence struggle in Ghana under Nkrumah, and disseminated, among the African Diaspora, information about African challenge to British colonialism and Nkrumah's role in that direction. ¹⁴ When Nkrumah emerged as the Prime Minister of Gold Coast, prior to his country's independence, he visited the United States in 1956, and met with many African-Americans and was welcomed warmly by them. According to Vernon McKay:

Even before Ghana's independence day, many Americans were startled by the unusually emotional welcome Negroes gave Prime Minister Nkrumah, particularly in Harlem and Chicago, when he visited the United States in 1956. Not long before, when the editor of Ebony Magazine asked readers what subjects they wanted to read about, Africa was last on a list of 10. In a later poll, Africa reported jumped to first place. ¹⁵ 

Against this background, Nkrumah's visit to the United States was instructive. The visit enabled Martin Luther King, Jr., to address the fundamental change in the Black struggle for emancipation. Martin Luther King Jr. said “This is an era of offensive on the part of oppressed people. All peoples deprived of dignity and freedom are on the march on every continent throughout the world… [to liberty]” ¹⁶

In Martin Luther King's thinking, Nkrumah was an inspiration to their own struggle for Black emancipation. Besides, Nkrumah's presence presented Africa as a continent to be reckoned with in the perception of the African Diaspora. McKay explains it this way:

The rise of Africa not only won more attention in the Negro press, but it attracted Negroes in other ways…. The successful fight of Africans for freedom was a psychological boost to American Negroes in their efforts to reinvigorate the fight against racial discrimination. And it helped to bring new followers to the Black Muslim extremist movement in the United States, which advocates racial separation with ultimate black superiority. ¹⁷ 

Shortly after the independence of Ghana, Nkrumah intensified a working relationship with the African Diaspora in all human endeavours. In 1945 during the Manchester Pan-African Congress, DuBois informed him of his interest in The Encyclopaedia Africana project aimed to explore Africa's contributions to global civilization. After much entreaties by Nkrumah to DuBois to relocate to Ghana, this African Diaspora sage later relocated and continued with his encyclopedia project which he could not complete following his death in 1963. ¹⁸ However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the secretariat of the Encyclopedia Africana , as conceived by DuBois and later Nkrumah, published three volumes of that project. ¹⁹ These works inspired the publication of others such as The Dictionary of Global Culture (1997), and Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience (1999), all edited by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Both works symbolised the relevance of Ghana to African Diaspora relations.

Apart from the above mentioned influences, Nkrumah considered education as a major boost to nation building, the advancement of foreign relations and his Pan-African commitment. In April and December 1958, he convened two conferences in Accra, Ghana. The April 1958 conference was tagged “The Conference of Independent African States” attended by seven African independent states. The conference, among others, adopted the concept of African unity and Pan-Africanism. In the December 1958 conference tagged the “All African People's Conference” Nkrumah told his audience that its aim “was to encourage nationalist political movements in colonial areas as a means towards continental unity and socialist transformation of society”. ²⁰ He further said that the four main stages of achieving importance of the conference were along Pan-African lines namely:

1. National independence
2. National consolidation
3. Transnational unity and community
4. Economic and social reconstruction on the principles of scientific socialism. ²¹

In the pursuit of these principles, Nkrumah held a landmark conference in Accra whereby many scholars from all over the world attended. It was called the First International Congress of Africanists which pursued Nkrumah's ideas of African Studies. According to Nkrumah in his address during this conference:

African studies is not a kind of academic hermitage. It has warm connections with similar studies in other parts of the world…. Your meeting here today as Africanists from various countries of the world is truly historic. It emphasizes the idea that knowledge transcends political and national boundaries. It is incumbent upon all Africanist scholars all over the world, to work for complete emancipation of the mind from all forms of domination, control and enslavement. ²² 

This 1962 conference represented Nkrumah's belief that Africa should regenerate its image battered by slavery and colonialism and create a new paradigm towards emancipation. By this belief, the convergence of many scholars with bias towards Black Studies raised the stakes high towards a new direction. Thus, the floodgate towards the study of African Studies opened in Africa, the United States, the Caribbean and Asia. G. N. Uzoigwe, the Nigerian historian avers that: “Just as the Gold Coast assumed a leadership role in African political emancipation so also was it in the forefront in the development of the study of African history.” ²³

From that Accra conference, a new impetus in the study of African history within American institutions was pursued vigorously. As John A. Rowe noted in the 1970s:

The study of African history is a new phenomenon in the American academic scene. Its development and expansion… has been remarkable. No courses or seminars on African history were offered at any major American university prior to 1957….It seems hardly a coincidence that 1957 saw both the independence of Ghana - the first African colonial territory to achieve sovereignty - and the introduction of African history into American classrooms. ²⁴

Against this background, Nkrumah's foreign policy thrust, was partly devoted to the interests of the African Diaspora. Many African Diaspora activists, scholars, entertainers, among others, visited Ghana to settle, teach and pursue their political careers. Du Bois came to Ghana and reinstated his commitment to write an African Encyclopedia which he could not complete prior to his death in 1963, as earlier noted. ²⁵ Others such as “Black Panther party leaders like Eldridge Cleaver and Huey P. Newton took direct inspiration from Du Bois in linking black freedom struggles in the U.S. to African decolonization.” ²⁶ Ghana, therefore, became a haven for other African Diaspora activists such as Maya Angelou, Amiri Baraka, Malcom X, Muhammad Ali, George Padmore, among others who visited Nkrumah to study his philosophy of Black emancipation. ²⁷ During his Presidential era, Nkrumah's advocacy for African unity led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Malcolm X, a foremost fiery Black Muslim leader towed that Pan-African line in the United States when he formed the Organization of the Afro-American Unity (OAAU) in 1964. ²⁸ Nkrumah's Presidency, to a large extent, was a purveyor of Ghana- Diaspora relations particularly from cultural and educational perspectives. His writings, speeches, conferences and direct political actions embedded in radical and charismatic leadership endeared him to these Diaspora leaders

In February 1966, Nkrumah's government was toppled by the military, but while in Guinea on exile, Nkrumah pursued his African Diaspora activities in polemical form. 

Nkrumah, His Conakry Years and African Diaspora 

Kwame Nkrumah was a guest of President Sekou Toure after he was ousted from power. From 1966 to 1972, Nkrumah lived in Conakry, Guinea and continued to address many issues on Africa and the African Diaspora. By this time, decolonization movements in Africa had taken a violent turn, particularly within the Southern African zone. There, nationalist leaders adopted a violent approach through armed struggle to address issues of colonialism and imperialism. In the West, the death of a fiery Black leader Malcolm X, and a moderate, pacifist one, Martin Luther King, Jr. both by assassinations, threw open, within the confines of Western politics, other Black leaders such as Stokely Carmichael, Amiri Baraka, Eldrigde Cleaver, from the United States and Obi Egbuna, a Nigerian immigrant to the United Kingdom, as militant leaders. These Black leaders propagated their liberation through armed struggle, ²⁹ from what they called the “Black colony of North America” 

While in Conakry, Nkrumah devoted his time on the African Diaspora professing the Black Power Moment (BPM) and the Black Panther Party (BPP) as avenues for liberation. Both associations were enemies of capitalism, racism and neo-colonialism. Nkrumah supported them and churned out releases to aid them in what Nkrumah called the African Revolution, which he identified as “the phase of armed struggle”. ³⁰

By 1965, many African Diaspora youths in the city of Los Angeles armed themselves as they confronted the white establishment in the United States against discrimination. Their slogan was Black Power, vocal while Nkrumah was in Conakry, Guinea. In a release, entitled “What is Black Power?”, Nkrumah states thus:

I see it in the United States as part of the vanguard of world revolution against capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism which have enslaved, exploited and oppressed, peoples everywhere and against which the masses of the world are now revolting. Black Power is part of the world rebellion of the oppressed against the oppressor, of the exploited against the exploiter. It operates throughout the African continent, the North and South America, the Caribbean, wherever Africans and people of African descent live. It is linked with the Pan-African struggle for unity on the African continent, and with all those who strive to establish a socialist society. ³¹ 

Nkrumah highlighted the links between the Black Power Movement in the West and the armed struggle in Africa. To highlight that relationship, he authored a book in 1968 entitled, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution . The book was a manual on the political and military dimensions of liberation in Africa and the African Diaspora . Nkrumah elaborates on the importance of the book for emancipation:

The Black Power Movement in the U.S.A., and the struggles of peoples of African descent in the Caribbean, South Africa and elsewhere, form an integral part of the African politico-military revolutionary struggle. Our victory will be their victory also, and the victory of all revolutionary, oppressed and exploited masses of the world who are challenging the capitalist, imperialist and neo-colonialist power struggle of reaction and counter-revolution. ³² 

Nkrumah's military and political constructs as enunciated in the book, were anchored on party formation in conjunction with creation of a military formation for Africa and the Diaspora. He called the political party the All-African People's Revolutionary Party (AAPRP) and its military wing, the All African People's Revolutionary Army (AAPRA). ³³ Undoubtedly, while in Conakry, Nkrumah's thoughts had tilted towards violent protests as a result of the insidious nature of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. In the United States, Asia, and the Caribbean, the oppressed peoples were in ferment against racism, discrimination, labour exploitation and war perpetrated by the capitalist nations. Nkrumah lent a hand to them by suggesting a radical African co-ordination in the attainment of their liberation, though, in practical terms, these two political and military constructs could only be viewed as parts of his theoretical formulations for liberation. Throughout the heyday of violent decolonization in Africa, and race riots in America, Britain and elsewhere, Nkrumah's AAPRP was not deployed as a vanguard, neither did the AAPRA, his military wing participate in protest or military action.

Be that as it may, in the midst of turmoil against Blacks, other African Diaspora activists took Nkrumah's thoughts on the party formation called the AAPRP, and gave it much attention. A notable Black Power leader called Stokely Carmichael left the United States in 1968 to Conakry, Guinea, where he met Nkrumah, and became the organizer of the AAPRP. Carmichael who died in 1998 had earlier in Conakry, changed his name to Kwame Toure, in honor of his two mentors in Pan-Africanism, Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. ³⁴

While the Black Power crisis subsisted in America and Britain, Nkrumah in 1968 sent a release to them entitled “Message to the Black People of Britain.” While extolling these Black combatants, Nkrumah reminded them thus:

The finger of history is now pointing to the right direction. In my days in London we organised the Coloured Men's Association, and today in the emergence of Black Power you have organisations like the RASS headed by Michael X and the Black Panther Movement headed by Obi Egbuna. These two organisations are advocates of Black Power, and must mobilise, educate, and re-awaken the black people of Britain to the full realisation of their revolutionary potential. ³⁵

Nkrumah paid tribute to Obi Egbuna, the Nigerian Black Power leader for fighting against “discrimination, prejudice and racial hostility in Britain.” ³⁶ Obi Egbuna had been indicted in a British court in 1968 for his militant actions in the country. ³⁷ In deference to Nkrumah's relations with Black advocates in Britain, Black activists made him their patron. While accepting that honour, Nkrumah assured them that “I will stand behind you in all your Black revolutionary endeavours, and I hope you will answer my call when the clarion sounds.” ³⁸ When Nkrumah died in 1972, Obi Egbuna described him as a “patron saint”, ³⁹ because Nkrumah was an outstanding supporter of their cause.

Nkrumah's short period in Conakry, Guinea was quite productive. He wrote many books on Africa and African Diaspora and devoted his twilight days in receiving Black activists in person. He received tremendous accolades globally for his Pan-African vision from these Black advocates, as shared by Nkrumah in one of his books. ⁴⁰

Conclusion

This article has examined the pivotal roles Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana played in the link between his country and the African Diaspora. It argues that Nkrumah's personality embedded on his ideological views and penchant for the liberation of the Black race, globally, enabled the Ghana-African Diaspora link along multiple dimensions.Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in March 1957 and left copious publications on colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. These themes that Nkrumah explored in his writings were intertwined with the ideas of other scholars of African and African Diaspora descent in their writings, researches and teachings leading to much synergy in diverse ways. ⁴¹ Consequently, Nkrumah had multiple contacts through educational and political ideas. From the 1962 First Conference of the Africanists, and cultural exchanges, many of the African Diaspora activists, scholars and entertainers settled in Ghana in order to teach and seek new ideas about Ghana's role in global politics. Between 1966 and 1972, when Nkrumah was stripped of state functions as the President of Ghana, through a military coup, the African Diaspora link was called African Revolution by Nkrumah. It was a more embracive link, at a time of armed struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism in Africa, Caribbean, Asia and the United States.

This paper asserts that Nkrumah's stature as a Ghanaian leader and statesman was a driving force in strengthening Ghana-African Diaspora relations. 

Notes

1. Appiah, K. A., & Gates, H. L., Jr. (1999). Introduction: An encyclopedia of the African diaspora. In Appiah, K. A., & Gates, H. L., Jr. (Eds.), Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience (pp. ix-xii). New York: Basic Civitas Books.
2. Barlow, W., & Shapiro, P. (1971). An End to Silence: The San Francisco State Student Movement in the 60s . New York: Pegasus.
3. Boahen, A. (1975). Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries . London: Longman.
4. Carmichael, S. (1994). Pan-Africanism: Land and power. In Chrisman, R., & Hare, N. (Eds.), Pan-Africanism (pp. 9-19). New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
5. Davidson, B. (2007). Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah . Oxford: James Currey.
6. Egbuna, O. B. (1971). Destroy this Temple: The Voice of Black Power in Britain . New York: William Morrow and Company.
7. Egbuna, O. B. (1978). The ABC of Black Power . Lagos: Third World First Publications.
8. Fyfe, C. (Ed.). (1976). African Studies since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson . London: Longman.
9. Gumi, S. M. A. (1992). Where I Stand . Spectrum Books.
10. Hauser, T. (1991). Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times . London: Robson Books.
11. Hill, R. (Ed.). (1990). Walter Rodney Speaks: The Making of an African Intellectual . Trenton: Africa World Press.
12. Karenga, M. (1989). Introduction to Black Studies . California: University of Sankore Press.
13. Mack-Williams, K. (1993). Carmichael, Stokely. In Williams, M. W. (Ed.), The African American Encyclopedia, Volume 1 (p. 276). New York: Marshall Cavendish.
14. Malcolm X. (1968). The Autobiography of Malcolm X . London: Penguin.
15. McKay, V. (1964). Africa in World Politics . New York: Macfadden Book.
16. Mullen, B. V. (2016). W. E. B. Du Bois: Revolutionary Across the Color Line . London: Pluto Press.
17. Nkrumah, K. (1962). I Speak of Freedom . New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher.
18. Nkrumah, K. (1973). Revolutionary Path . London: Panaf Books.
19. Nkrumah, K. (1974). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism . London: Panaf Books.
20. Nkrumah, K. (1976). Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah . New York: International Publishers.
21. Nkrumah, K. (1978). Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-colonisation . London: Panaf Books.
22. Nkrumah, K. (1980). Class Struggle in Africa . London: Panaf Books.
23. Nkrumah, K. (2006). The Struggle Continues . London: Panaf Books.
24. Nkrumah, K. (1974). Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare . London: Panaf Books.
25. Nkrumah, K. (1976). Dark Days in Ghana . London: Panaf Books.
26. Rowe, J. A. (1970). Major themes in African history. In Paden, J. N., & Soja, E. W. (Eds.), The African Experience, Volume 1: Essays (pp. 154-176). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
27. Uwechue, R. (Ed.). (1991). Makers of Modern Africa: Profiles in History . London: Africa Books Ltd.
28. Woddis, J. (1971). Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America . New York: International Publishers.
29. Wallerstein, I., & Gutkind, P. C. W. (1976). (Eds.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa . London: Sage Publications.
30. Nkrumah, Consciencism, vi.
31. Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues,39-40. 
32. Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (London: Panaf Books, 1974), i.
33. Ibid, 56-58.
34. See Kibibi Mack-Williams “Carmichael, Stokely”, in Michael W. Williams (ed) The African American Encyclopedia, Volume 1 (New York: Marshall Cavendish, 1993), 276. 
35. Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues, 15.
36. Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, 430.
37. See Obi B. Egbuna, Destroy this Temple: The Voice of Black Power in Britain (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1971), 36-45. 
38. Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues, 14.
39. See Obi B. Egbuna, The ABC of Black Power (Lagos: Third World First Publications, 1978), 1.
40. See Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London: Panaf Books, 1976), 160-223.
41. For details, see Stokely Carmichael “Pan-Africanism: Land and Power” in Robert Chrisman and Nathan Hare (eds) Pan-Africanism (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1994), 9-19; Maulana Karenga, Introduction to Black Studies (California: University of Sankore Press, 1989); Robert Hill (ed) Walter Rodney Speaks: The Making of an African Intellectual (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1990); Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds) The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1976); Jack Woddis, Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America (New York: International Publishers, 1971); William Barlow and Peter Shapiro, An End to Silence: The San Francisco State Student Movement in the 60s (New York: Pegasus, 1971); Christopher Fyfe (ed), African Studies since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson (London: Longman, 1976).